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Abstract

As modern infrastructures become more interconnected, the decision-making
process becomes more difficult because of the increased complexity resulting from
infrastructure interdependencies. Simulation and network modeling provide a way to
understand system behavior as a result of interdependencies. One area within the asset
management literature that is not well covered is infrastructure system decay and risks
associated with that decay.
This research presents an enhanced version of Haimes’ input-output inoperability
model (IIM) in the analysis of built infrastructure systems. Previous applications of the
IIM characterized infrastructure at the national level utilizing large economic databases.
This study develops a three-phased approach that takes component level data stored
within geographic information systems (GIS) to provide a metric for network
interdependency across a municipal level infrastructure. A multi-layered approach is
proposed which leverages the layered data structure of GIS. Furthermore, Monte Carlo
simulation using stochastic decay estimates of each component shows how infrastructure
risk, as a result of interdependency effects and component decay, changes over time.
Such an analysis provides insight to infrastructure asset managers on the impacts of
policy and strategy decision-making regarding the maintenance and management of their
infrastructure systems.
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NETWORK INTERDEPENDENCY MODELING FOR
RISK ASSESSMENT ON BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS

I. Introduction
Built infrastructure systems and assets are so vital to modern society that their
disruption can lead to severe consequences for a country’s national security, economy, or
public health and safety (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Infrastructures
are highly interconnected systems and study into these relationships is a new and rapidly
growing area (Satumtira & Dueñas-Osorio, 2010). Understanding these relationships,
and combined within an asset management framework, can facilitate better decisionmaking in the maintenance and management of infrastructure systems. As modern
infrastructures become more interconnected, the decision-making process becomes more
difficult because of the increased complexity resulting from infrastructure
interdependencies. Authors have characterized the different types of infrastructure
interdependencies (Haimes et al., 2007; Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001) and
researched ways to model and simulate infrastructure behavior as a result of these
interdependencies (Bagheri & Ghorbani, 2008; Brown, 2007; Pederson, Dudenhoeffer,
Hartley, & Permann, 2006). Simulation and modeling provides a way to understand
system behavior as a result of interdependencies.
This work presents an application of systems engineering principles to the study
of infrastructure asset management and the issue of system decay. The dissertation
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surveys the literature in order to develop an understanding of the perspectives of asset
managers. It finds that there is a shift in thinking taking place among asset managers
from discipline-specific to more integrated systems-thinking in the management and
maintenance of their systems. This shift offers the opportunity to explore systems
engineering principles that might result in better decision-making by asset managers.
The area specifically explored in this work is in simulation and modeling. Specifically,
the input-output inoperability model (IIM) is explored and identified such that geographic
information system (GIS) data can be leveraged in the understanding of system risk due
to decay.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, an overall summary of the dissertation
research and its documentation are provided. First, the research motivation behind the
modeling and analysis of built infrastructure systems as interdependent networks is
presented. This section outlines the challenges and failures that asset managers
experience in the performance of their duties and why re-thinking of infrastructure
systems as interdependent networks is beneficial. Next, a high-level summary of the
relevant literature which demonstrates a systems knowledge gap in the literature is
presented. Following this, the problem statement, research objectives, and significant
contributions for this work are articulated in their own respective sections. Finally, the
chapter closes with a detailed overview of the remaining chapters and appendices of the
dissertation document.
1.1 Research Motivation
Infrastructure asset managers face many challenges as they carry out their
responsibilities in the operation, management, and maintenance of infrastructure systems.
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A number of authors suggest that a change in perspective to a systems approach in the
management of infrastructure is necessary in order to overcome these challenges (Godau,
1999; Hansman, Magee, De Neufville, Robins, & Roos, 2006; Lewis, 2006). Examples
of these challenges include increased technical complexity of modern systems, greater
external pressures from non-technical sources (e.g., the general public, local and national
governments), the scale and vastness of infrastructure systems, inadequate tools in the
analysis and management of infrastructure systems, and natural and human threats.
Hudson, Haas, and Uddin (1997) argue that, although the practice of infrastructure asset
management is not new, past practices have not always been systematic and that a change
in management philosophy is necessary. These works highlight the need for addressing
infrastructure management from a holistic, systems-centric approach.
As evidence of this viewpoint, this research has found that, indeed, much of the
existing research in infrastructure management seems to address questions as they relate
to a single infrastructure. Generally, infrastructure sectors (such as transportation,
electrical, water/wastewater, facilities, etc.) are examined in isolation without regard to
interactions with other sectors. Although there is a growing body of research into
infrastructure interdependencies, which takes a network-view of multiple infrastructure
systems, more work is needed in this area so as to better understand these “system of
systems” relationships. Taking this kind of approach is necessary to answer complex
questions regarding cascading effects and sources of infrastructure risk and vulnerability.
Understanding this, Hansman et al. (2006) lay out a research agenda to progress
towards a comprehensive theory for the design and management of infrastructure
systems. They highlight that infrastructure managers have failed in recognizing and
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managing the technical and social considerations of infrastructure systems and that this
failure is one reason for the change of perspective. Changes to current research should
include addressing these social considerations, strengthening the ties of research with
industry practice, and taking an approach that seeks commonality across the
infrastructure domains. Given these views, they detail a four-part agenda that is a
fundamental re-thinking of infrastructure design and management. These elements are:
(1) a comparative analysis across infrastructure domains, (2) creation of integrated sociotechnical infrastructure models, (3) methodology development, and (4) application testing
and evaluation. Their work is significant as it reinforces the need for understanding the
interdependency effects of built infrastructure systems. The work in this dissertation
specifically addresses Hansman et al.’s agenda item of methodology development as the
dissertation presents a model which integrates disparate infrastructure systems and
enables simulations and analyses across infrastructure systems. It is clear that
understanding infrastructure interdependency effects through a systems approach will be
beneficial to asset managers as they address both the technical and non-technical
challenges of infrastructure management.
1.2 Background
Systems engineering offers the philosophical framework for addressing the
challenges of asset management. This is demonstrated in a number of ways in the
literature. For example, Cook and Ferris (2007) argue that systems engineering, as a
multi-methodology, is an appropriate way to solve traditionally non-systems engineering
problems. The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) developed the
Infrastructure Systems Working Group (ISEWG) and published a special physical
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infrastructure issue which highlighted systems engineering applications to specific
infrastructure types (Bauknight, 2004; Doukas, 2004; Krueger, 2004; Williams,
McManus, Patel, & Williams, 2004). However, the work wherein systems engineering
principles are explicitly used to address asset management problems stops with this issue.
Instead, the literature demonstrates that there is a growing chorus among asset managers
that systems engineering processes and approaches should be applied to asset
management practices and problems (Godau, 1999; Hudson et al., 1997; Powell, 2010).
Most recently, Powell (2010) documented leaders from throughout the engineering and
infrastructure industry calling for more systems approaches as the industry collectively
addresses the challenges of the U.S.’s decaying physical infrastructures. Additionally,
the literature demonstrates that conceptual overlaps between the practices of asset
management systems engineering processes already exist which suggest that applying a
systems approach to infrastructure management is feasible. Highlighted in Appendix A,
a comparative analysis between the fields of asset management and systems engineering
is conducted which demonstrates the conceptual overlaps. The conclusion from this
analysis is that core processes in asset management are already well-defined and codified
within systems engineering. Therefore, a systems approach would indeed benefit
practitioners of asset management.
The intersection of asset management and systems engineering is the viewpoint
that this dissertation begins with in addressing infrastructure decay and its contribution to
infrastructure risk. Surprisingly, infrastructure risk from decay is not well studied. In
addressing infrastructure risk, researchers have focused on risk within the context of
terrorist attack or natural disaster. Works such as Bagheri and Ghorbani (2008);
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Cummings, McGarvey, and Vinch (2006); McGill, Ayyub, and Kaminsky (2007); and
Lewis (2006) demonstrate this particular view, which exclude infrastructure decay as a
source of risk and are representative of the majority of the work in the infrastructure risk
literature.
An effort that does begin to address infrastructure decay as a source of risk comes
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2009, the DHS Science and
Technology directorate sponsored the Aging Infrastructure workshop where the
challenges and solutions to the nation’s decaying infrastructure were debated and
discussed. The workshop acknowledged that decay is a significant contributor of risk to
the nation’s infrastructures (Doyle & Betti, 2010), but the study of decaying
infrastructure has not taken hold in the literature. Unlike the works centered on the risks
to infrastructure from terrorist attack and natural disasters, few scholarly works exist that
address understanding the effects to infrastructure systems from decay. With the
exception of the national transportation system, there exists a gap in knowledge about the
quantification and quantifiable effects of these decay factors on other infrastructures.
Another unexpected area where research seems to be lacking is in the modeling of
infrastructure behavior as a network of connected edges and nodes. The National
Research Council (2005) reported that the study of networks as a science and applications
of principles from this science are still in its early stages. As modern infrastructures have
become more interlinked, knowledge of an infrastructure’s network properties would lead
to insights and predictions on its behavior. For example, understanding cascading effects
is of interest to asset managers as mitigation and recovery plans can be developed which
would reduce the impact of triggering events (Zimmerman & Restrepo, 2009).
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Interlinked infrastructures, which form a network of networks, give rise to the idea of
system interdependencies and also methods in analyzing these interdependencies. In
their seminal work, Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) establish the framework for
infrastructure interdependencies. Relationships between two infrastructures that are
mutually necessary for each other’s operation is defined as an interdependency. The
existence of interdependencies increases system complexity and creates behaviors that
are not intuitively predictable but can be analyzed through various simulation and
modeling methods. Infrastructure interdependencies modeling and the risks resulting
from these interdependencies is an actively researched and growing field (Satumtira &
Dueñas-Osorio, 2010). Appendix B of this dissertation provides a survey on the
modeling and simulation methods of infrastructure interdependencies and classifies them
into four broad groups: input-output inoperability modeling, agent-based modeling,
graph theory (network) modeling, and other emerging models.
1.3 Problem Statement
Of the six core processes of asset management, two processes will be specifically
addressed in this dissertation. The first of these is the information systems and data
management process which requires that systems be in place such that relevant
information is collected, available in a timely manner, valid and complete, and that
archived data is accessible (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011). The other process is the risk
assessment and management process which includes steps such as identifying risks,
analyzing each risk, and developing mitigation strategies (Haskins, 2010; Roberts,
Hughson, Smith, McIlveen, & Murray, 2006). The information and data process are
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inputs into the risk assessment and management processes. One such information system
commonly used in asset management is the geographic information system (GIS).
GISs are data systems which relate the geographic location of a system
component to other attributes of that component. From GIS data alone, it is possible to
define the network attributes of an infrastructure as well as model the interconnected ties
to other infrastructures. However, a common problem within these systems is that the
network ties are often lacking, that is, the network has no topological connections and
therefore the resulting data model is simply a collection of lines which are drawn near to
points in space. A second problem is the use of spatial data for risk analyses. Many
location problems are solved within GIS such as determining the shortest possible route
or best location for a facility, but risk analyses are a class of problems not normally
solved with spatial data. Typically, GIS is relegated to the visual display of risk analysis
results, if integrated into the risk analysis and management process at all.
The power of a GIS is in its relational database structure. As a relational
database, it relates different attributes of system components to each other. Geographic
location is just one attribute and any number of attributes can be identified and stored
within a GIS. Given this, attributes that indicate the aging process of system components
can be stored and, in concert with network topology, a method might be able to leverage
this data for a risk analysis from system decay. This dissertation addresses the issue of
infrastructure risk from decay through the modeling of infrastructure systems as
interdependent networks.
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1.4 Research Objectives
The intent of this research is to develop a model that provides insight into the
effect of decay as a contributor to risk associated with networked infrastructure systems.
Given the research problem statement, the work contained within this dissertation
addresses these problems through answering the following questions:
•

How can risk to infrastructure be quantitatively modeled?

•

What aspects of networked systems (that is, what metrics) are applicable towards
infrastructure risk analysis?

•

How do interdependencies of networks affect this analysis?

•

How can the concept of infrastructure decay be modeled and simulated so as to
produce a valid infrastructure network risk model?

1.5 Method Overview
The method chosen for this research is to simulate the propagation of risk through
interdependent physical infrastructure systems. Specifically, input-output inoperability
modeling (IIM) is explored and then modified such that the risks from physical
infrastructure interdependencies can be determined. Two sources of data were required
for this research. In the early stages of model development, simulated data was used in
order to test the mathematical constructs for the modifications to the IIM. These
simulated data consisted of small networks with few nodes to facilitate verification of the
model output. Later stages of model development utilized GIS data on actual utility
systems acquired from practicing asset managers. This data contained information on
thousands of system components organized according to infrastructure type. This GIS
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data provided the basis for the network topology necessary for infrastructure
interdependency modeling.
Data analysis consisted of applying the developed model to the data available and
interpreting the resulting output from each application. An iterative procedure that
simulated the inoperability of each system component was created and the results
recorded. Each of these results provided a level of network interdependency generated
by a particular system component. A static analysis of the model, where each component
is analyzed only once, as well as a dynamic analysis, where Monte Carlo simulation is
employed, were carried out as the modifications to the IIM were developed. In each trial,
novel metrics articulating network interdependency effects were produced and these
results and their applicability are discussed.
There are three major phases to this research. The first phase focuses on the
development of a manageable problem. A smaller problem demonstrates general
principles before applying these principles to a larger, more complex problem. In this
first phase, the IIM is adapted from and applied to a six-node network representing a
small infrastructure system. Monte Carlo simulation is incorporated into the model in
order to explore the effect of decaying components. The second phase extends the model
developed in phase one to a multi-layer model which leverages the multi-layer data
structure of a GIS. Finally, the third phase of the research employs the developed multilayer model on utility system GIS data for a small municipality such as an Air Force
base. The data acquired for this final phase is representative of the state of infrastructure
system data kept by asset management organizations and therefore tests the applicability
and validity of the developed model.
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1.6 Research Contributions
The research conducted in this dissertation will aid infrastructure asset managers
in developing and choosing the best policies and strategies as their systems continue to
age. Specific research contributions include:
•

The simplification of the input-output inoperability model allows for the modeling
of interdependencies and its effects in a networked system. Reducing elements of
the interdependency matrix to Boolean values transforms the matrix to a
directional adjacency matrix and ignores the strength of each connection, but this
allows for the generalizability of the model.

•

The proposed method finds that systems are often tree network structures and
conventional network analysis methods will not account for the criticality of
source nodes. Results from the proposed method will identify these critical
components.

•

Modeling utility lines as nodes within a network, rather than as network edges,
further informs the model by accounting for their role as interdependent
components of the system.

•

Applying Monte Carlo simulation to the proposed model provides a means for
projecting future maintenance requirements on aging systems as the asset
management community suffers from a lack of studies and data on the reliability
of infrastructure components.

•

A multi-layer model is proposed for multiple infrastructure systems which
abolishes the need to create a single, large network of nodes and instead leverages
the layered data model of a GIS to aggregate infrastructure data.
11

•

The interdependent nature of infrastructure systems naturally introduces cycles
and loops within the system and creates the problem of non-invertability of the
model. This work presents a solution to this problem by modeling cycles and
loops in an acyclic manner as branches in a tree network.

1.7 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation follows the scholarly article format and presents three journal
articles which document the research according to the phased approach outlined in
Section 1.5. Chapter 2 describes a small problem of analyzing a simple six-node
infrastructure system. It provides a brief discussion on the practice of infrastructure asset
management and the use of modeling within that particular field. The chapter also
provides a synthesis of the literature on infrastructure interdependencies as various
authors diverge on the classifications of interdependency types. After examining the
issue of infrastructure decay, the input-output inoperability model is described and
modifications to the model are proposed. These modifications include the creation of the
component decay score metric and integration of Monte Carlo simulation. The proposed
model is applied to a simplified network problem and the chapter closes with a discussion
on the simulation outputs and significant findings from this first phase. Chapter 2 has
been submitted to Structure and Infrastructure Engineering: Maintenance, Management,
Life-Cycle Design, and Performance.
Chapter 3 extends the six-node infrastructure model to a multi-layered model
using layered geospatial data. This is an intuitive approach for infrastructure asset
managers who employ GIS as part of their maintenance management systems. As
Chapter 3 is intended to be a stand-alone article, a brief discussion of the IIM and its
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limitations is presented. Following this, the intersection of network analysis and GIS is
examined. This examination concludes that network methods within GIS systems are
limited to a small class of problems – the shortest path problem. Given the prevalence of
GIS as a component of asset management systems, this work offers an opportunity to
advance the state of knowledge in the field of asset management. The multi-layer model
is presented through an example problem and the significance of the proposed approach
concludes the chapter. Chapter 3 has been submitted to the International Journal of
Strategic Asset Management.
Chapter 4 implements the developed models from previous chapters to data
collected on four utility systems of a small municipality. GIS data alone provides the
topology necessary to construct the interdependency matrices for each utility system. As
outlined in the previous chapters, the models produce results which identify the most
important nodes within each individual system and implements the multi-layer analysis
method; the results of a Monte Carlo analysis simulating decay are then presented. The
chapter highlights the differences in results between typical network metrics used in
characterizing network structure and the results from the proposed modifications of the
IIM. The chapter concludes with significant findings stemming from the third and final
phase of the research. Chapter 4 will be submitted to the Journal of Management in
Engineering.
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion to the document by summarizing the research
effort. It begins by addressing each question of the research objectives, then presents the
significant findings and key contributions of the work; finally, recommendations for
future work are listed. Two appendices follow this chapter which provide an extended
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literature review on the overlap between systems engineering and infrastructure asset
management and research methods in the area of infrastructure protection and modeling.
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II. Infrastructure Decay Modeling with the Input-Output
Inoperability Model (IIM) 1

2.1 Introduction
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology
directorate sponsored the Aging Infrastructure Workshop where participants discussed
and debated the roles, challenges, and solutions to the nation’s aging infrastructure. The
workshop acknowledged that decay is a significant contributor of risk to the nation’s
infrastructure. The workshop and the subsequent publication of its findings partially
fulfilled the DHS’s stated goal to disseminate information as quickly as possible on
technology and methods for addressing the problem of the United States’ decaying
infrastructure (Doyle & Betti, 2010). Efforts to hold this issue at the center of national
attention have fallen short, as evidenced by U.S. government spending. From 1950 to
1970, the U.S. spent 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) on infrastructure and in the
1980s, this figure dropped to 2% of GDP; for China and India, the most recent figures are
9% and 5% respectively (Reid, 2008). Figures such as this show that U.S. policy-makers
dedicate fewer resources to the construction, operation, and maintenance of the nation’s
infrastructure relative to other countries. Practicing engineers also contribute to this
problem by failing to connect such funding shortfalls to relatable public consequences.
Instead, dramatic infrastructure failures such as bridge collapses and natural gas line
failures garner national media attention for a short while and then dissipate as quickly as

1

The contents of this chapter were independently submitted for publication by Valencia, Thal, Sitzabee,
and Colombi to Structure and Infrastructure Engineering: Maintenance, Management, Life-Cycle Design
and Performance on February 12, 2013.
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they appeared. Finally, the academic literature in the area of infrastructure decay is
found to be lacking. Policy-makers are more concerned with infrastructure protection
within the context of infrastructure risk as a result of extreme events such as a deliberate
attack (i.e., terrorism), accidents, or natural disasters. However, the larger national
consequence in terms of money, time, and safety will result from decayed infrastructure.
Unfortunately, comparatively little has been written in recent decades on the effect of
aging infrastructure.
Systems engineering and infrastructure interdependency analysis are two growing
fields of study that researchers and practitioners in infrastructure asset management can
use when studying the problem of infrastructure decay. This chapter synthesizes
concepts from these areas in such a way that is useful to both practitioners and
researchers of infrastructure asset management. Specifically, we propose a model that
provides a risk ranking method that leads to a maintenance strategy by accounting for the
networked and interdependent nature of multiple infrastructure assets and systems.
Although risk ranking models in asset management have been suggested by others (e.g.,
Krishnasamy, Khan, & Haddara, 2005; Sathananthan, Onoufriou, & Rafiq, 2010),
cascading effects as a result of network interdependencies are not explicitly addressed in
these methods. This paper thus characterizes disparate infrastructure systems as
interconnected, interdependent infrastructures and produces a risk ranking model based
on component decay. Such a model would be useful in prioritizing infrastructure assets
for tasks such as inspections or maintenance and repair. The paper is organized as
follows. First, conceptual overlaps between systems engineering and asset management
are presented to show that systems engineering concepts have broad applicability to asset
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managers. Second, a review of the academic literature on infrastructure
interdependencies is provided that highlights the research methods and concepts on the
topic. Finally, these two areas are combined and a framework based on the input-output
inoperability model is proposed, which provides a new and useful method in the study
and understanding of risk from infrastructure decay.
2.2 Asset Management and Modeling
The asset management paradigm is complex and still in nascent stages of
development for civil engineers (Spatari & Aktan, 2013). Indeed, there is no single,
widely accepted definition for the practice of infrastructure asset management, but there
are common themes found in the literature (Cambridge Systems Inc, 2002; Grigg, 2003;
Hoskins, Brint, & Strbac, 1999; Roberts et al., 2006; U.S. DOT, 1999). This section
presents some of the predominant themes as they relate to infrastructure decay modeling.
One such theme is the criticality of quality infrastructure system data to asset
managers. Inventory and condition state data are essential for performance model
development (Rasdorf, Hummer, Harris, & Sitzabee, 2009). Continuing advances in
geographic information systems over the past decade now make the collecting and
maintaining of geo-spatial data, for example, common place. Knowing the location of
the asset and its subsystems enables the use of spatial modeling techniques. Additionally,
inspection history and maintenance data inform other modeling techniques in use by asset
managers.
Modeling transforms data into information by, for example, revealing
relationships between system components or enabling predictions for system behavior or
individual component behaviors. For the model presented in the paper, data are used to
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estimate component decay which provides the current and future condition states of the
asset. Through network dependency/interdependency analysis, these predicted condition
states are then used to estimate the changing risk to the networked system over the life of
the individual components.
Another theme in asset management is the recognition that engineering managers’
primary duty is to allocate resources for infrastructure operation and maintenance to align
with the enterprise’s larger strategic goals. Modeling facilitates meeting these
requirements, as forecasts are typical outputs for system models. These predictions
inform decision-makers of possible system behavior such as likely future outputs,
possibilities of failures, and other system scenarios. With such information, asset
managers should develop optimized plans for the repair and maintenance of system
components. Through focused and purposeful planning, asset managers can better
articulate or allocate repair and maintenance resources in order to support enterprise
objectives. Indeed, the model suggested in this paper provides a predictive means for
estimating the failure likelihood of a single component, its impact across its own
network, and the ability to formulate alternative maintenance policies.
A final theme encountered in the asset management literature is the idea that
differing system perspectives lead to different management approaches. Specifically, the
International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) (Roberts et al., 2006) suggests
two different perspectives, “top-down” versus “bottom-up” asset management, which
lead to two different approaches in plan development. A “top-down” approach is the
practice of system decomposition whereby engineers first understand a system as a single
entity and then decompose the system into smaller and smaller subsystems or
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components for greater understanding. Such an approach is considered a core function of
asset management. Its converse is the “bottom-up” approach whereby system
information is collected at the component level. Figure 1 highlights how advanced asset
management organizations have moved beyond the top-down approach and practice
bottom-up approaches to inform their decision-making. Some argue that true asset
management, being enterprise-wide, entails managing data both vertically and
horizontally within the system and thus requires that both a top-down and bottom-up
approach be simultaneously implemented (Cambridge Systems Inc, 2002).

Figure 1. Top down vs. bottom up approach. (Roberts et al., 2006)

The understanding of the infrastructure system from both top-down and bottomup perspectives is necessary for the decay model presented in this paper. Top-down
views are needed since infrastructure systems are networks and methods utilizing
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network analysis, specifically interdependent network analysis, should be considered in
the core stages of asset management practice. Decomposition of these networks into
subsystems, and ultimately collection of data at the component level, leads to a bottomup view of the system. Such a dual perspective is necessary as the model requires decay
data for each component in the system.
2.3 Infrastructure Interdependencies
Infrastructure systems are highly interconnected systems within theselves
(components are networked together to function as a single system) and to other systems
(outputs from one system are inputs to another). These interconnections, whether internal
or external, create system behaviors that can be predicted if modeled or simulated
correctly. The results from predicting infrastructure behavior would ultimately result in
maintenance policies or initiatives for the optimized management of infrastructure.
Because individual infrastructure systems are not stand-alone and require other systems
to function, the idea of infrastructure interdependency and identifying the risks as a result
of these interdependencies is an actively researched and growing area of study
(Cummings et al., 2006). The following is a brief review of the concept of infrastructure
interdependencies.
2.3.1 Dependency versus Interdependency.
Although focused on critical infrastructure protection, the seminal work of
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) has facilitated research in the area through its
basic definitions on interdependent infrastructures. To begin, Rinaldi et al. (2001)
establish the difference between the terms dependency and interdependency. An
infrastructure dependency is a uni-directional relationship between two infrastructures.
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In other words, one infrastructure relies on the output of a different infrastructure (or
infrastructures) and this relationship is not reciprocal. In contrast, an infrastructure
interdependency is a bi-directional relationship between two or more infrastructures in
which the infrastructure outputs are mutually relied upon by the infrastructures involved.
In other words, an interdependency exists when systems are dependent on each other.
Conceptually simple, the notion of interdependencies increases the complexity of a
system and this complexity leads to behaviors by the “system of systems” that is not
intuitively predictable.
2.3.2 Interdependency Types.
Rinaldi et al. (2001) furthered the idea of infrastructure interdependencies through
categorizing interdependency types. They establish that four types exist: physical, cyber,
geographic, and logical. Others have provided similar classifications of
interdependencies (e.g., Haimes et al., 2007; Johansson & Hassel, 2010; McNally, Lee,
Yavagal, & Xiang, 2007) and their works are compared in this section. Remaining with
Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) framework, the four interdependency types are briefly defined
here. Physical interdependencies are relationships based on material outputs from one
infrastructure passed to another as a material input. Cyber interdependencies exist when
information is the entity passed between infrastructures. Geographical interdependencies
are based on physical proximity, e.g., infrastructures are located such that a localized
event affects the status of these infrastructures. Logical interdependencies exist when
there is a bi-directional relationship; this relationship is neither physical, cyber, nor
geographical; and a logical reasoning is used to define the interdependent relationship.
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A variation of Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) work, Haimes et al. (2007) incorporates
economic interdependencies and suggest that these interdependencies result in the ability
to predict the economic behavior of whole infrastructure sectors or an entire geographic
region. A regional economic interdependency is similar to a geographic interdependency
by spatially bounding the infrastructures of interest. An inter-sector economic
interdependency captures the linkages of entire economic sectors without the bounds of
geography. Haimes et al. utilize the well known economic input-output analysis method
for their study of economic interdependencies.
Finally, McNally et al. (2007) and Johansson and Hassel (2010) offer a simpler
framework for infrastructure interdependency by proposing only two classifications of
interdependency types: functional and spatial. Their framework suggests that Rinaldi et
al.’s (2001) classes of physical, cyber and logical interdependencies be classified under
the broad term of functional interdependency while spatial interdependencies receive the
same treatment as a geographical interdependency. Figure 2 shows these various
classifications and highlights the overlap in concepts between the three classification
frameworks.
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Figure 2. Graphical comparison of three interdependency classification frameworks.

Interdependency types are important to understand as they contribute to
differences in relationships within and across infrastructures. For example, when dealing
with time scales, input-output exchanges based on cyber interdependencies occur in very
short cycles compared to physical exchanges. As another example, spatial and functional
interdependencies differ from each other as spatial interdependencies are static (do not
move) whereas functional interdependencies are dynamic (quantities involved in the
input-output exchange vary). Understanding the differences between the
interdependency types is necessary in building accurate and realistic models and
simulations.
2.4 Infrastructure Decay
The infrastructure of the United States was designed and built largely after World
War II, thus making the age of these systems 50 to 60 years old. In the American Society
of Civil Engineer’s (ASCE) 2009 infrastructure report card, several systems were
highlighted as either having or are nearing their expected design life of 50 to 70 years
(ASCE, 2009). Additionally, the lack of public interest and therefore public funding has
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led to a significant lack of maintenance, thereby contributing to infrastructure decay.
Engineering leaders generally agree that the primary problem faced by all infrastructure
sectors is the decaying of their systems (Powell, 2010). However, as noted earlier,
engineers have not articulated well the linkage between infrastructure decay and
consequences to the public.
Infrastructure decay is made up of four components: time, exposure, lack of
maintenance, and usage (Zimmerman, Restrepo, & Simonoff, 2010). The significance of
each of the four components on decay will vary across different infrastructure types. For
example, underground utilities are subject to different environmental exposure than say
bridges and roads. Exposure, therefore, might not be a consideration for understanding
decay in underground utilities. As another example, age may not be indicative of a
decaying infrastructure. The New York City transit system, one of the oldest in the
nation, showed its resiliency in returning to operation after the subway damage and
shutdowns following the September 11, 2001, attacks (Zimmerman et al., 2010) and,
more recently, Hurricane Sandy flooding (Santora, 2012; Snider & Everett, 2012). In
addition, the effect of decay is different on different infrastructure systems. For example,
the Army Corps of Engineers recently found deteriorated storm water drainage pipes and
degraded pumping systems along a 6-mile stretch in Brookport, Illinois (Flesher &
Burdeau, 2013), and the ASCE has documented the deterioration of the nation’s
roadways (ASCE, 2011). Should the 6-mile segment of the flood protection system fail
and an equally long or longer segment of roadway fail, the effects from such failures,
obviously, are not equitable. Take any two different infrastructure systems and the
effects from decay will be different given the disparate services each system offers. So
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determining the effect of decay is further complicated since its effect varies across
infrastructure types.
This chapter offers a method to better understand the problem of infrastructure
decay and its relation to risk. This currently open question has relevance to asset
managers for the following reasons. First, a decayed system will be much less resilient in
responding to extreme events. If the future does hold more extreme weather phenomena
due to global warming, then the nation’s infrastructure will be at more risk and relevant
policy and management strategies cannot be developed without understanding the
underlying cause and effect of risk from decay. Second, as the cost of system
rehabilitation increases considerably as time (or decay) increases, so does risk. Although
notional, Capers and Valeo (2010) note that decreases in levels of infrastructure service
and increases in required maintenance will accelerate over time. Thus, decay results in a
non-linear relationship to degraded service and increased cost. Finally, correlating decay
and risk is no easy endeavor. Unlike actuaries in the insurance industry, infrastructure
managers may not have historical data that can provide a decay-risk profile. The
National Transportation Safety Board may be an exception as they implement biennial
bridge inspections as part of their asset management strategy. Other infrastructure
sectors would be served well doing the same, but in the mean time, methods and
techniques will have to be developed, and research conducted, to fill this knowledge gap.
This paper offers a contribution to the existing literature by proposing a model that
articulates the risk of decaying infrastructure components on an interconnected,
networked system.
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2.5 The Input-Output Inoperability Model and Risk Assessment from Aging
Infrastructure
Acknowledging the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems leads to
considering ways to model and simulate infrastructure network behaviors. Methods
utilizing various techniques exploring the effects of interdependent infrastructures
include agent based modeling, graph theoretical methods, social network analysis, system
dynamics, and input-output analysis (Satumtira & Dueñas-Osorio, 2010). This paper
presents a method based on the input-output inoperability model (IIM) developed by
Haimes and Jiang (2001) which is an adaptation of the Leontief input-output analysis.
Many extensions and adaptations to the IIM have been proposed such as the Dynamic
IIM (DIIM), the Multi-Regional IIM (MR-IIM), and others (e.g., Barker & Haimes,
2009; Haimes et al., 2007; Santos, 2008). The model presented herein proposes an
adaptation to the IIM, but with several departures that allow for the modeling of
infrastructure risk as a result of decay.
Based on Leontief’s work on economic interdependencies, the IIM models the
effects of a perturbation in a network through an understanding of node
interdependencies throughout the network. Leontief’s input-output (I-O) model makes
use of economic databases that track exchanges between economic sectors and, thus,
establishes a measure of interdependency between these sectors. The exchanges of
resources and goods between sectors are viewed as an input or output of a sector, hence
the title of the modeling method. An I-O analysis is able to determine the system-wide
effects of a perturbation in one or more sectors. Similarly, the IIM is interested in
understanding the effects of a perturbation and also takes advantage of data-rich
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economic databases; however, rather than understanding economic impacts, the IIM
seeks to understand the propagation of “risk of inoperability.”
The risk of inoperability, or simply inoperability, is the key adaptation to
Leontief’s I-O model. Haimes and Jiang (2001) and Haimes (2009) define inoperability
as “the inability for a system to perform its intended function.” Inoperability is likened to
the concept of “unreliability” which describes the probability of failure for a system.
Inoperability is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 where zero denotes no inoperability
(flawless operation) and one denotes complete inoperability (complete failure). The
authors suggest that these inoperability values be developed from expected values of risk
based on the likelihoods of failure and levels of failure. Thus, the IIM proposes that
inoperability equates to risk and that these risks are passed between infrastructure
systems given the interdependent nature of nodes in a network. The compact matrix
notation of the IIM is presented below:
q = A ⋅q + c

(2.1)

The operation to solve Equation 2.1 is simply:
[I − A]−1 ⋅ c
q=

(2.2)

Vector q, the damage vector, is the final solution to the model and is a collection
of inoperability values for all n infrastructures modeled in the system. Thus, this vector
indicates the level of lost capacity of all infrastructures after the introduction of some
perturbation in one or more infrastructures in the system. Vector c, the scenario vector,
is the collection of introduced perturbations in the system. A scenario could be a natural
disaster or terrorist attack, and this vector provides a means of entering the direct damage
to infrastructures 1 to n as a result of the modeled scenario. A, the interdependency
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matrix, is an n x n matrix that captures the extent of interdependence among
infrastructures. For example, if the complete failure of infrastructure j results in the
complete failure of infrastructure k, then element a kj = 1. As another example, if the
complete failure of infrastructure j results in a 50% failure of infrastructure k, then
element a kj = 0.5. If there are no connections between infrastructures, then element a kj =
0. Therefore, matrix A is a normalized, square matrix that represents the probability of
transferring inoperabilities from one infrastructure to another. Finally, the I-matrix is
simply an n x n identity matrix used for solving the IIM model. See Haimes and Jiang
(2001) and Haimes (2009) for a full treatment of the derivation of the IIM.
With the IIM briefly explained, this paper presents four departures from the IIM
and aids in the study and understanding of infrastructure decay for asset managers. First,
the scale of this proposed model is limited to built infrastructures where the network
model represents system components as nodes and the system interdependencies of these
components (i.e., physical, cyber, logical, and geographical) are edges, or links, of the
network. A “top-down” approach to modeling is required as a network view of the
infrastructure system must be taken. Understanding the nodes and linkages between
these nodes is needed to build the interdependency A-matrix.
Second, rather than attempting to specify the likelihood and degree of
interdependency, this model proposes that any interdependency (whether physical, cyber,
logical, or geographic) be specified as Boolean, either 0 or 1, in the interdependency Amatrix. Thus, if component k has no dependency to component j, then a kj = a jk = 0.
Should an interdependency exist, say j is dependent on k functioning, then a kj = 1 and a jk
= 0. Although it could be argued that this represents a significant limitation by ignoring
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the degree or “strength” of the relationship, limiting the elements of the A-matrix to
Boolean values simplifies the IIM modeling. In fact, a major limitation to the IIM is the
extensive data collection and data mining that might be necessary in determining the Amatrix as suggested by its authors. Use of Boolean values mitigates this limitation as the
proposed model now only requires that the direction of an interdependent connection be
known. The simplification of the A-matrix creates a more generalized model, thereby
increasing the potential for use of the IIM framework.
The third departure from the IIM concerns the use of probability distributions for
elements of the c-vector. Probabilistic IIM methods have already been proposed (Barker
& Haimes, 2009; Haimes et al., 2007; Santos, 2008), but the current model differs as it
proposes to (1) employ component decay curves and (2) apply such curves for each
component in the system. This model seeks to illustrate the effect of decay across the
networked system and transforms the c-vector from a scenario vector with static
inoperability values, typically used to represent probabilities of extreme events, to a
decay vector, denoted as c*, which represents component decay curves for all
components in the system. With this transformation, a challenge is introduced whereby
probability distributions for decay must be collected for all components of the system.
This challenge is significant. Such decay curves do not readily exist for many
infrastructure assets, yet implications, such as cost, based on these curves are freely
discussed (Capers & Valeo, 2010). Some work exists in the literature that addresses the
development of life expectancies for infrastructure system components, but as Datla and
Pandey (2006) acknowledge, these efforts are problematic since industry does not have
adequate data to develop these failure estimates. Others suggest the use of non-
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probabilistic, qualitative methods such as risk-matrices and ordinal scaling to simplify the
evaluation of components (e.g., Sathananthan et al., 2010), but such suggestions do not
capture the stochastic, time-dependent nature of decay. These methods instead only offer
a single “snapshot” of component risk at the time of evaluation. They offer no predictive
capabilities for changes in risk over time. The incorporation of component decay curves
would allow for such a dynamic analysis. If a “bottom-up” asset management approach
is put into practice, asset management organizations might either already have such
component-level decay data or are working towards the collection of it. Although
challenging, collecting this data is a necessary component towards advanced asset
management practice.
The final and fourth departure is the introduction of the component decay score,
decay_score i (t). Most IIM modeling techniques seek to determine the expected amount
of incapacity an infrastructure industry would experience given some disturbance in the
networked industries. That is, given some scenario, these models would identify the
reduction in capability on specific, individual nodes in the network. To measure the
impact of individual node decay across the network, this paper proposes that the column
summation of the damage vector q of each node i at each time t, which result from the
probabilistic inoperabilities due to decay, be collected and compared to develop an
ordered list of critical components over time. At each time t, the IIM equation is solved
for the “destruction” of a single node and the column summation of the resulting q-vector
is collected. The destruction of each node i at each time t then follows the probability
distributions contained in the decay vector, c*. Thus, for each i at each t:
q *i (t) =
[I − A ]−1 ⋅ c *i (t)
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(2.3)

where c *i (t) is the vector where node i is inoperable, c i = 1, and all other nodes j are
fully operable c j = 0 (such that 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) at a time t. The Monte Carlo method allows for the
deterministic calculation of each node i at each time t given the distributions contained in

c*(t). To gather the component decay scores, the column summation of each q* i (t) is
stored as:
j

decay _ scorei (t ) = ∑ q *i (t)

(2.4)

i =1

The component decay scores from Equation 2.4 serve as a method to identify the effect of
a decaying component i on the overall network of components for every time increment t.
2.6 An Interdependent, Simple Infrastructure Example
In this section, a six-node network is used to demonstrate the procedure for
arriving at the infrastructure decay scores and the implications behind the results. The
three components of this IIM variation are described, followed by the Monte Carlo
algorithm, and finally a discussion of the results.
Figure 3 illustrates the simple, six-node network. This example shows a case
with clear interdependencies of two infrastructures, water and electrical, servicing three
facilities. The water infrastructure delivers water to the facilities by means of a pump
house while the electrical infrastructure provides power for these facilities plus the pump
house and the water tower. To facilitate the iterative matrix calculations, the node list of
the systems must be ordered and this list is provided alongside the illustration.
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Figure 3. Illustrative six-node network of two infrastructures.

Given the Boolean assignments for the node interdependencies, the determination
of the interdependency A-matrix is simply the transpose of the directional adjacency
matrix, A(D), of the network. This is due to differences in matrix conventions between
IIM modeling and graph theory. Using the ordered node list shown in Figure 3, A(D) and
its transpose A are presented in Equations 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. As an illustration,
element a(D) 13 for the A(D) matrix is equal to element a 31 of the A-matrix, both of which
equal 1. This indicates that the pump house is fully dependent on the electrical source
operating. Should the electrical source fail, the full inoperability of the electrical source
is transferred to the pump house.
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(2.6)

The development of the decay vector, c*, is determined from collecting the decay
distributions for each node in the system. For this example, the Weibull distribution,
W(α, β), is used and parameterized such that all nodes exhibit a decay behavior, typically
α > 1. Further, the distributions are varied such that the source nodes for electricity and
the water tower have a mean time to failure of 18.6 years (α = 4, β = 20) and all other
nodes (pump house and buildings) have a mean time to failure of 8.7 years (α = 3, β =
10). These parameters were chosen strictly for the illustrative purposes of this example
and equation 2.7 presents the decay vector.

 W (4, 20) 


 W (4, 20) 
 W (3,10) 
c* = 

 W (3,10) 
 W (3,10) 


 W (3,10) 
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(2.7)

Monte Carlo simulation provides a feasible method for the deterministic
calculations required to solve the IIM model yet account for the stochastic nature of
component decay. With Monte Carlo simulation, the effect of the decay distributions for
each node can be determined. The algorithm for such an operation involves a series of
iterative steps where the results of the inoperability of each node is determined in the
following manner. First, at time t, node 1 is sampled. Dependent on the probability of
failure of node 1 at time t, this node has a Boolean value of either zero (operating) or one
(failed). The IIM calculations are carried out with this node’s sampled value and all other
nodes set to zero. The resulting deterministic calculation results in a q 1 (t) vector and this
vector is column summed according to Equation 2.4. The column summation results in a
sample decay score for node 1 at time t, or decay_score 1 (t). The step is repeated for all
other nodes at time t and repeated further for a predetermined number of iterations at time
t. For this example, n = 1,000 was found to produce adequate convergence of solutions
for each node at each time t. The resulting decay scores are averaged and thus, at each
time t, each node has an average sample decay score. The algorithm is repeated for time
steps of Δt = 0.1 years through 40 years. The results of the simulation are presented in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Simulation results from modified IIM.

There are several interesting implications to the IIM using the proposed
simulation method. First, if one were to explore the inoperability effects of each node
deterministically, it could be done simply by iterating down the list of nodes,
“destroying” each node (i.e., c i = 1 for i = 1 …6), and summing the resulting damage
vectors. Such a calculation would produce a bar graph (Figure 5) which is helpful in
determining “critical nodes.” The illustration indicates that the system’s most critical
components are the electrical source, water tower, and pump house. Indeed, the steadystate solution of the Monte Carlo simulation (i.e., Figure 4 at t = 40.0 years) indicate the
same order for a criticality list.
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Figure 5. Bar graph of critical nodes from deterministic IIM.

Introduction of decay distributions, however, are able to capture the effect of time
and component reliabilities on the overall system. For an asset manager with a 10 to 15
year outlook, Figure 4 reveals that attention must be paid to the pump house first, rather
than the electricity and water sources. This is due to two factors. First, the reliability of
the pump house less is than that of the two infrastrucutre sources. Second, the pump
house’s role as a “hub” of services for the network amplifies its criticality to the system.
As the electrical source and the water tower serve as source nodes to the network, their
outages result in cascading impacts across the entire network. The pump house serves as
an intermediary in the network and so its outage also results in a cascade of failures, but
with a partially operable network (albeit that the only two operating nodes are the sources
in this example) and a lower criticality score in the long run. The deterministic, steadystate IIM captures this effect. The proposed model, however, is able to capture the
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dynamic effect of decay and emphasizes the importance of the pump house in the shortterm. Insights such as this can lead asset managers to a better understanding of decay
effects on their network and produce better policy and maintenance strategies.
Examples of such strategies include identifing the optimal times for repairs or
defining a risk-based decision-making strategy. For example, one possible strategy could
be to repair or replace the pump house before certain failure occuring somewhere around
year 15. This would be an example of a preventive maintenance strategy and one based
on a risk-averse approach to management. Alternatively, if accepting risk is part of a
broader maintenance strategy, an asset manager might now better articulate the impact
and the changing levels of impact over time should the asset management organization
forgo maintenance and instead adopt a reactive maintenance strategy for the pump house
or other nodes.
Finally, the component decay scores, decay_score i (t), offer the magnitude of
effects from an outage of a particular node. Whereas the electrical source scores eight
points in the steady-state analysis (i.e., t = 40.0 years), the buildings only score one point.
This is due to the directionality of the inoperabilities and the cascading effect that this
modeling technique captures. An outage of the electrical source not only affects itself
and the delivery of electricity to the pump house and buildings, but it also affects water
delivery to the buildings since the pump house relies on electricity to operate. The
simulation captures the cascading effects of an electrical outage whereby the buildings
are inoperable twice (once for electricity outage and again for water outage). This
cascading of inoperability accounts for the resulting high score for the electrical source.
The buildings, on the other hand, contribute no inoperability to the system and therefore
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act as “sinks” in the network of nodes. Thus, their contribution of inoperability to the
overall system is a result of their own outage and no other cascading effects.
This simple example illustrates the procedure in this modified version of a
probabilistic IIM. The determination of the interdpendency matrix as strictly Boolean
values simplifies one step of the IIM model. Inclusion of decay probability distributions
admittedly adds a different complexity, but asset management organizations may already
have such data or methods can be used to estimate such probabilities. Finally, Monte
Carlo simulation allows for a practical means of solving this model. Taken together,
asset managers have a means of understanding the effects of decay to the infrastructures
they manage.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper presents a modifed version of the IIM which incorporates probalistic
decay functions and Monte Carlo simulation to capture the dynmaic analysis of node
inoperability. This is in contrast to the deterministic calculations of the original IIM.
The four departures from the original model include limiting the scale of analysis to built
infrastructure, using Boolean assignments for the interdependency A-matrix, introducing
the decay vector c*, and introducing the component decay score, decay_score i (t), which
is a column summation of calculated damage vectors over time. An example was
presented that illustrated the computations and highlighted the insights to be gained from
the method.
The framework in this paper helps asset managers understand the effects of
component decay throughout their interdependent networks. In addition, several key
findings are highlighted:
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•

Modeling in asset management requires quality data to support the
modeling process

•

The primary output of such a process must lead to thoughtful resource
planning which supports strategic objectives

•

Infrastructure interdependency analysis requires both a top-down and
bottom-up system perspective be taken

•

The interdependency A-matrix using Boolean assignments ignores the
strength of connected system components, but the simplifications lead to a
generalizable model and increase the potential for use

•

The c* decay vector requires probabilistic failure distributions, i.e., decay
curves, that do not readily exist for infrastructure assets

Given these findings, several opportunities for future research in the topics of
infrastructure decay and interdependencies are apparent. For example, further
exploration in engineering reliability may offer insight into how to estimate reliabilities
for expansive networked systems typical of built infrastructures. As stated before, the
collection of component-level decay data for these infrastructures presents a formidable
challenge. As another example, one possible solution to dealing with the expansiveness
of systems might be to identify the proper level of abstraction for modeling
infrastructures. Developing methods and understanding the effect of such abstraction
could be further studied. A final example of future research might be to explore multilayer modeling as it is applied to the IIM. Currently, the IIM must model interdependent
systems as a two-dimensional field of adjacent nodes. An IIM approach using a multi-
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layer, three-dimensional model may increase understanding of cascading effects between
disparate infrastrucutures.
Infrastructure asset managers play an important role in society as they are charged
with ensuring the consistent delivery of basic services. Conceptual overlaps with several
academic and engineering fields have been demonstrated in this paper. Presented herein
is a product of such an overlap and represents one possible method for asset managers in
managing their infrastructure systems.
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III. Multi-Layer Modeling for Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 2

3.1 Introduction
Network analysis provides a powerful means of modeling and studying
infrastructure system behavior. Many applications in recent years attempt to capture the
behavior of interdependent infrastructure networks (Satumtira & Dueñas-Osorio, 2010).
The modeling approaches are varied and some directly address the multi-layered nature
of interdependent infrastructure systems. Examples of recent multi-layer modeling
include Kurant and Thiran (2006) who explore topological differences between a
physical layer (a road network) and corresponding logical layer (network of traffic
flows). Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, and Havlin (2010) develop an interdependent
network analysis framework based on an Italian power network and its supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system network. Brummitt, D’Souza, and Leicht
(2012) study the effect of changing interconnections between two distinct power grid
networks. Critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment within the context of layered
infrastructure systems was proposed by Johansson and Hassel (2010).
These works differ from other, single-layer network studies in their treatment of
infrastructure systems. Rather than limiting the scope of their modeling to a single
infrastructure type or characterizing multiple infrastructures as a single network, the
works highlighted above maintain distinct infrastructure layers but relate these layers to
one another through a mapping layer. They take on a multi-layer modeling paradigm that

2

The contents of this chapter were independently submitted for publication by Valencia, Sitzabee,
Bulutoglu, Colombi, and Thal to the International Journal of Strategic Engineering Asset Management on
May 23, 2013.

41

is able to relate disparate infrastructure networks to each other. This paradigm
necessitates the creation of an inter-layer which models the node connections from one
layer to the next. Kurant and Thiran (2006) call their inter-layer a “mapping,” Buldyrev
et al. (2010) create the terminology “A

B links” to denote node connections from

layer A to layer B, Brummitt, D’Souza, and Leicht (2012) use the term
“interconnections,” and Johansson and Hassel (2010) use the term “functional
dependencies.” Regardless of the terminology and the respective methodologies, these
studies have in common the creation of an additional layer to capture inter-network
connections from one layer to the next.
A multi-layer approach in the modeling of interconnected infrastructure systems
is an intuitive approach for geographic information system (GIS) users. Church (2002)
highlights that the use of data layers has a long history in mapping and cartography and is
the basis of GIS analysis today. Layers in a GIS are a collection of data on entities which
share common attributes and are stored together (Longley, Goodchild, Maguire, & Rhind,
2011). For example, the shape and location of lines for a water distribution system could
be stored in a layer, the point locations and attributes of valves and pumps in another
layer, and the facilities that the distribution system serves in yet another layer.
Aggregating these together provides a single grouped layer which represents the water
distribution network in its entirety. A GIS has the ability to store and present individual
infrastructure systems and facilities as a single layer, albeit a layer of layers, because GIS
uses geo-location as a common key in its relational data structure to link all the data sets
together. Therefore, a GIS facilitates a multi-layer approach in the analysis of
interdependent infrastructures.
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This chapter proposes a method of analysis that takes advantage of the relational
database structure of GISs to further study and identify the interdependencies in
infrastructure systems. Based on the well known input-output inoperability model (IIM)
developed by Haimes and Jiang (2001), we present a modification of the model which
allows for the use of multiple adjacency matrices combined with “mapping” layers to
represent a system of interdependent infrastructures. The remainder of this article is
organized as follows. First, the IIM is briefly described with a discussion of its two
primary limitations. Second, a case is made which outlines the suitability of a modified
model in a GIS environment. Third, the proposed method of integrating aspects of the
IIM and GIS data structures is introduced with a three-layer facilities example. Finally,
the article concludes with significant findings, limitations, and possible extensions of the
model.
3.2 Input-output Inoperability Model
For any network, topologies can be captured in the form of a simple twodimensional matrix by recording node connections in an adjacency matrix (West, 2001).
A pair of nodes connected by an edge are considered adjacent and variations to the
adjacency matrix, such as edge weighting and directionality, can capture differences in
adjacencies, such as connection strength, flow, and direction. Lewis (2009) asserts that
adjacency matrix representation is an efficient and compact method for storing network
topologies. Indeed, many studies utilize network adjacency matrices in studying
infrastructure interdependencies. A well studied method is the input-output inoperability
model and its extensions, developed by Haimes and others (Barker & Haimes, 2009;
Crowther & Haimes, 2005; Haimes & Jiang, 2001; Haimes, 2009; Santos, 2008), which
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capture network interdependencies across a system of infrastructures. Based on the well
known input-output (I/O) technique (Miller & Blair, 1985), the effect of a perturbation in
one part of a networked system of infrastructures can be calculated for other parts of the
system.
The IIM uses a network’s topology in matrix form to understand this propagating
effect in a system of infrastructures. Termed the “risk of inoperability,” the IIM captures
the risk of transferring “inoperation” from one node to a connected node through a
modified adjacency matrix. In compact matrix form, the matrix notation of the IIM is:
q = A ⋅q + c

(3.1)

where c, the scenario vector, describes the disruption in the network. If the system being
modeled has n number of nodes in its network, the size of column vector c is n x 1. Each
entry in vector c is an inoperability value between 0 and 1, where zero denotes no
inoperability, or fully operational, and one denotes complete inoperability, or fully
damaged. Thus, a simulation modeling an event which completely destroys a particular
node would enter a 1 at that node’s position in vector c while all other entries in c would
be a 0. A value in c between 0 and 1 indicates the percentage that a particular node is
inoperable. The damage vector, q, describes the resulting damage of each node after
application of the scenario vector, c. Much like the scenario vector c, q is sized n x 1,
and each entry in q describes the inoperability after application of the scenario. Vector q
is the vector of interest and represents the effect of the network perturbation.
At the core of the IIM is the interdependency matrix, A, which represents the
network topology and the risks of transferring inoperabilities within the network. Matrix
A is sized n x n and contains entries between 0 and 1, where any entry greater than 0
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denotes a directional link between two nodes. For any entry a ij , a 0 would indicate that
there is no risk of transferring inoperability between node j and node i. Any entry greater
than 0 denotes that node j has some probability of transferring its inoperability to node i.
It is interesting to note that A is a modified adjacency matrix in that the matrix entries are
continuous values from 0 to 1, rather than Boolean, and the convention of directionality is
reversed. For example, if a ij = 0.35, this entry indicates that the complete malfunction, or
inoperability, of node j would result in 35% reduced operation of node i. To solve
Equation 3.1, the operation is simply:
q=
[I − A]−1 ⋅ c

(3.2)

where I is the n x n identity matrix and the inversion of (I – A) is necessary for solving
vector q. Haimes and Jiang (2001) and Haimes (2009) provide further details on the
derivation of the IIM.
Although mathematically sound, the IIM suffers from two challenges involving
matrix A. First, the development of the inoperability A-matrix is a challenge because of
the level of abstraction chosen for the networks to be studied. For example, the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) is commonly cited as a data source in the development of
the A-matrix. The BEA data contains inputs and outputs for entire economic sectors, so
an individual node in this style of modeling represents an entire infrastructure sector with
no ability to decompose each sector into its own network. IIM analysis occurs at a high
level of abstraction, taking a top-down view, and precludes the study of technical
infrastructures at the component level, or bottom-up view. In their seminal work, Haimes
and Jiang (2001) highlight that data collection for the A-matrix is indeed a significant
challenge and list “pointers” to overcome this challenge.
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Second, matrix algebra operations utilized in the IIM must be executed on twodimensional matrices. Therefore, modeling of multiple infrastructure systems must be
conducted with a single, inherently large network. Although multi-dimensional matrix
operations have been defined (Solo, 2010 a-f), application of these methods is not
possible due to dimensionality constraints when carrying out multi-dimensional matrix
algebra. Specifically, the IIM requires square matrices in defining its A matrix, a
constraint that might not be possible when defining interdependencies between
infrastructure layers since each layer most likely has differing numbers of nodes. To
model separate, yet interconnected infrastructure systems, the IIM must thus represent a
system of infrastructures as a single network.
With these two sets of challenges, the IIM is limited in its analysis of multiple,
interdependent networks to a single system and characterizes individual infrastructures
networks within that system as single nodes. In this paper, we argue that these challenges
can be overcome. The use of GIS addresses the first challenge of network abstraction. In
the last two decades, GIS has undergone an increase in use and availability (Longley et
al., 2011). The widespread availability of data has driven the creation of data models
specific for network analysis and these methods can be applied to geospatial asset
management data. To address the second challenge of matrix algebra operations on a
multi-layered system, a modification to the IIM procedure will allow for these
calculations to be carried out. Using GIS and a multi-layer framework will allow for the
extension of the IIM model to built infrastructure systems.
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3.3 Network Analysis and GIS
Network analysis has evolved over the last decade such that specific GIS data
structures and utilities are commonly available in off-the-shelf software packages
(Curtain, 2007). These GIS network data models are significant as they provide the
ability to merge the spatial representation of real-world features with topological
relationships of the underlying network (Lwin & Murayama, 2012). Therefore, the
mathematics of graph theory and network analysis can be applied to GIS datasets. The
ability to store, retrieve, process, and display spatial and attribute data provides a GIS the
potential to execute a wide range of network analysis studies.
However, Curtin (2007) finds that most network analysis methods are limited to
transportation infrastructures and that these methods are simply a variant of a classical
graph theory problem, the shortest path problem, which seeks the shortest route for a
node pair in a connected network. The variants of the shortest path include routing
problems, facility location-allocation analyses, closest facility problems, and origindestination cost analyses. Indeed, one common GIS software package, ArcGIS supplied
by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), offers a fully integrated
network analysis module that solves these exact problems (ESRI, 2013). Other
researchers share Curtin’s view. Lwin and Murayama (2012) highlight the same problem
sets as common functions in a GIS. Fischer (2004) explores three specific network
problems, namely the travelling salesman problem, vehicle routing problems, and
constrained shortest path problems. Although they have different objectives, these GIS
network methods remain variants of the shortest path problem.
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For infrastructures other than transportation, solutions to the shortest path
problem provide limited utility in the management, operation, and maintenance of
technical infrastructure systems. An example of an infrastructure network simulation and
analysis method available in a GIS is the utility tracing function. The tracing function
highlights the networked path of connections from one node to another and can show the
set of disconnected nodes if flow is blocked. Another example is the flow analyses
function which provides the flow direction of a utility system given a set of source and
sink nodes. Although insightful, these two functions remain within the realm of the
shortest path problem. Network problems found in the infrastructure literature go beyond
finding the shortest path and include network risk and vulnerability problems, critical
node and link analysis, identifying cascading effects across a network, and indentifying
cascading effects across interdependent networks (Haimes, 2009; Lewis, 2006; Lewis,
2009). Currently, these types of studies frame their network problems in a purely
topological context without regard to spatial attributes; therefore, these types of studies
are not well represented in the GIS literature.
A primary benefit of a GIS is its ability to aggregate such data as these systems
are based on relational data models. Navathe (1992) reviews the evolution of data
modeling and highlights that the widespread use of these models is due to their basis in
the mathematical definitions of sets and relations. The underlying mathematics of
relational data modeling allows for the comparison of large “sets” of data. Entire tables
become arguments for operations such as joins, unions, intersections, etc., and this allows
for powerful data analysis techniques. Navathe (1992) further states that relational data
models are suited for addressing common issues such as data fragmentation, redundancy,
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and distributed operations; additionally, Halfawy (2010) suggests that many
infrastructure management organizational environments are pre-disposed to perpetuate
these data integrity issues. A GIS is a powerful tool as it will not only aggregate data
employing data integrity constraints, but it will do so by using location as a referential
key. Thus, for example, the data composing three infrastructure layers need not be
contained within one GIS but could be independent databases with a GIS linking these
data according to location. In fact, infrastructure data is often kept in a Maintenance
Management System (MMS) that is compatible with a GIS software package. This
allows users to keep various data current and accurate while allowing for easy integration
with other systems.
The prevalence of GIS as a central element in an asset management strategy
allows for the possibility to relate the spatial attributes of infrastructure assets to a
network analysis problem. Curtain (2007) suggests that the network analysis in GIS
presents many opportunities to expand the field’s analytic capability and we present an
analysis model in response to that challenge. Additionally, we assume that organizations
already possess, or have the ability to create, topologically correct network models from
their GIS data. Possessing such data is a significant assumption and we do not address
this issue in depth; given a “topologically clean” dataset though, directional adjacency
matrices can easily be extracted. The following section presents a multi-layer
interdependency framework based on the GIS data structure to enhance network analysis
beyond network shortest path problems.
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3.4 An Infrastructure Network Example
Given a network layer with n nodes, the directional adjacency matrix A(D) is an n
x n matrix with entries of m ij . Boolean assignments for each entry are used due to its
simplicity in expressing the existence of an edge, or connection, between nodes. An
entry of m ij = 1 indicates an adjacency from the node at row index (i) to the node at
column index (j). An entry of m ij = 0 indicates no adjacency between the two nodes at
the two indices. A(D) is not normally symmetric and so 𝑚𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑚𝑗𝑖 will most often hold
true. Additionally, m ii = 0 will hold for every node i since infrastructure systems do not

contain nodes with self loops, that is, infrastructures do not contain components that are
connected to itself. The directional adjacency matrix is a simple representation of a more
complex network.
Consider the following infrastructure system in Figure 6. The layered network
captures a three-layer infrastructure system of heating, water, and electrical distribution
systems consisting of six facilities. For the heating infrastructure, the system distributes
hot water for facility heating to Facilities 1 and 2. In the water infrastructure, the water
tower supplies water to the pump house which enables the transport of water to Facilities
1 and 2 and the heating plant. Finally, for the electrical infrastructure, the substation is
considered the source of electricity and provides power to four facilities: Facilities 1 and
2, the pump house, and the heat plant.
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Figure 6. A three layer infrastructure system.

3.4.1 Analysis with the IIM.
Recall that the IIM is used to determine a networked system’s inoperability given
a scenario that introduces a perturbation in the system. Such a disturbance could be the
reduced or total incapacity of some node in the system. If the three infrastructure systems
in Figure 6 are modeled as a single network, then the original IIM can be applied.
Supposing that the risk of inoperability for each interacting node is assumed to be 1, that
is, receiving nodes are 100% reliant on their source nodes, then the IIM’s
interdependency matrix, A, is simply a transpose of the network’s directional adjacency
matrix, A(D):
A = A( D)T
If we use the c-vector to model a scenario where the electrical substation is 100%
inoperable, we have the following parameters for an IIM analysis:
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(3.3)

Pump House
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A( D) =

Heat Plant
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0
0
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0
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Water Tower
Water Tower

1 0 0 0 0
1
0  Water Tower
0
0  Pump House
0 0 1 1 1 

 
Substation

0


1
1 0 1 1 1
 c =   Heat Plant I = 
0 0 0 1 1
0
0 
Facility
1
0
0 
0 0 0 0 0


  Facility 2
0 0 0 0 0
0
0 

0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0
 (3.4)
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1

Solving Equation 3.2, but with A = A( D)T as in Eq. (3.3), yields the following:

[I − A(D)T ]−1 ⋅ c
q=

→

 0  Water Tower
1  Pump House
 
1  Substation
q= 
 2  Heat Plant
 4  Facility 1
  Facility 2
4

(3.5)

Vector q, the damage vector, can be interpreted as follows. From top to bottom,
we find that the water tower is not affected by the complete inoperability of the
substation. The pump house, however, results in 100% inoperability as a result of the
non-working substation. The substation is also 100% inoperable as a result of the
scenario vector c. The heat plant results in 2 x 100% inoperability because the substation
no longer provides electricity to the heat plant nor does the plant receive water from the
inoperable pump house. The two facilities are 4 x 100% inoperable as a result of
accumulating inoperabilities from the pump house (100%), substation (100%), and heat
plant (200%). One interpretation of vector q might be that any node whose value is
greater than 1 should be considered 100% inoperable as a result of the scenario vector c
(Haimes, 2009). The results indicate that all nodes, except the water tower, are
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completely inoperable for the given scenario. Another interpretation could use the rank
order of the results to determine system vulnerabilities as part of a risk assessment
strategy (Crowther & Haimes, 2005). The resulting vector q from this IIM analysis is the
basis of comparison for the proposed multi-layer matrix model.
3.4.2 A Multi-Layer Model.
The term “layers” is used slightly differently in a GIS setting than in the proposed
model. In a GIS, the three infrastructures shown would consist of several data layers. A
data layer is analogous to a dataset where features with like attributes are stored together
(Longley et al., 2011). For example, a facilities layer would store geographic location,
geographic extent, and additional attributes such as building title, size, population, etc. In
the present example, a facilities data layer would consist of six entries, one for each
facility, and the associated attributes for each facility. For each infrastructure system,
two data layers are needed. The first layer would consist of the edges of the networked
system such as water piping, electrical, or heating distribution lines. The other layer
would consist of the junctions and endpoints of these lines. Therefore, a GIS setting for
this problem might require seven distinct data layers although there are only three
infrastructure layers to model.
In a network analysis model such as the IIM, modeling the system is limited to
modeling only a single network. One approach could be to model the system as three
discrete layers of water, electricity, and heating and then analyze them separately.
However, this fragmented approach would not capture network interdependencies.
Conversely, the system could be modeled as a “large” single infrastructure network,
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which would be more in line with the traditional IIM, but this method introduces two
other difficulties.
The first difficulty arises in attempting to discern network topology. If multiple
systems are aggregated and displayed as a single GIS layer, the determination of network
connections becomes problematic when lines from differing infrastructures cross. Basic
snapping and crossing rules used to automate the process of constructing a network may
inadvertently create junctions between two lines where one does not exist or ignore a
junction where one should exist. Therefore, geographic locations that are particularly
dense with infrastructure components would be difficult to accurately model. Second, the
inverse matrix operation of Equation 3.2 may not be possible if cycles or loops exist in
the network. This is problematic as the nature of interdependent infrastructures
necessarily means that these loops exist somewhere in the network. In fact, some
infrastructures are specifically designed in a looped arrangement to facilitate continued
service should a break occur which necessitates the isolation of a portion of the loop.
This finding and a solution to it are illustrated as a special case to the model proposed.
Given these challenges in interdependency modeling, we propose a multi-layer
modeling approach which, alongside the adjacency matrices for each infrastructure layer,
creates mapping layers to capture inter-layer interdependencies. These mapping layers
are similar to the inter-layer mappings found in Kurant and Thiran (2006), Buldyrev et al.
(2010), Brummitt et al. (2012), and Johansson and Hassel (2010). By using a multi-layer
modeling approach that employs mapping layers between infrastructures, the proposed
model: (1) leverages the power of a GIS in relating independent infrastructure data layers,
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(2) relieves some potential difficulties associated with discerning network topology, and
(3) eliminates a source of potential cycles in the system.
Using the infrastructure system illustrated in Figure 6, the needed matrices for
describing the proposed multi-layer model are displayed in Figure 7. The top level
matrix, M, is the multi-layer collection of each matrix describing the system of
infrastructures. Each of the matrices in M are directional adjacency matrices and use
Boolean assignments to capture these adjacencies. Thus, the water adjacency matrix,
A(D) water , captures the water network dependencies from the tower to the pump house
and then the pump house to the facilities and heating plant. Likewise, the electrical and
heating adjacency matrices, A(D) electrical and A(D) heating , respectively, capture the
dependencies for their distribution systems.
To capture inter-layer interdependencies, the mapping layers of I electricwater and
I waterheating are composed of nodes from interacting layers. Similar to the adjacency
matrix convention, nodes listed as row indices are “from” nodes which transfer
interdependencies to nodes listed as column indices. Again, an entry of m ij = 1 indicates
an adjacency between node i and node j while m ij = 0 indicates no adjacency.
Furthermore, mapping layers for all layer interactions need not be created. The iterative
procedure proposed below permits the capturing of interdependency effects as long as the
multi-layer matrix M lists each infrastructure layer once with mapping layers sandwiched
between theses infrastructures. Therefore, an I electricwater mapping layer is not created
for the example infrastructure.
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Figure 7. System of matrices representing the example three infrastructure network.

The system of matrices in Figure 7 represents the network topologies for the
interdependent, three-system infrastructure network. The first feature of the multi-layer
model is its leveraging of a GIS’s power through relating data on each system, which
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may exist independently, based solely on location. Further, the multi-layer model may
mitigate some problems of identifying network topology if the network connections of
each system are maintained independently. The last benefit of the multi-layer model,
elimination of potential cycles, is illustrated through the following proposed algorithm.
3.4.3 An Algorithm to Solve the Multi-Layer Network Problem.
Given the layered data structure of most GIS platforms, a multi-layered
framework is an intuitive approach for GIS users in the study of network
interdependencies. The following section outlines a procedure that utilizes such a
framework as applied to the simple infrastructure example illustrated and modeled in
Figures 6 and 7. The algorithm applies the IIM to individual infrastructure networks in
sequence, with an intermittent step for capturing and passing interdependency effects
between infrastructures. Figure 8 displays this iterative procedure.

Figure 8. Diagram for iterative multi-layer network problem.
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3.4.3.1 Step 1 – IIM Calculation.
Given the scenario vector c in Equation 3.4, the initial layer to analyze must
contain a node affected by vector c. Since the scenario involves a node from the
electrical infrastructure, Equation 3.2 is solved for the electrical infrastructure only. As
this operation involves only the set of nodes that compose the electric infrastructure,
scenario c is reduced to c electric . Equation 3.6 is the initial scenario.

celectric

1  Substation
0  Pump House
 
= 0  Facility 1
  Facility 2
0 
0  Heat Plant

(3.6)

The resulting operation to determine q electric is Equation 3.7.

−1

I − A(D)electricT  celectric
q electric =

1 Substation
1 Pump House

1 Facility 1
=
  Facility 2
1
1 Heat Plant

(3.7)

As in Equation 3.5, the transpose of A(D) electrical is taken to conform with the original
IIM’s A-matrix convention. The result of the operation is q electric and indicates that all
nodes of the electrical infrastructure layer are 100% inoperable as a result of the scenario
c.
3.4.3.2 Step 2 – Mapping Operation.
As there are remaining layers to analyze, a subsequent layer for the mapping
operation is chosen. This selection is based on the remaining nodes that are affected by
scenario c. If scenario c contains additional nodes affected, but not yet analyzed, then the
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layer which contains those nodes is chosen. In the present example, there are no nodes
remaining and the selection is arbitrary. Equation 3.8 presents the mapping operation to
derive a new scenario vector,

celectric →=
I electric → water T ⋅ q electric + c water
water

(3.8)

where I electricwater is taken from the system of equations in Figure 7 and transposed,
q electric is taken from Equation 3.7, and c water is the subset of nodes from the scenario
vector c that are part of the water infrastructure. Transposing I electricwater is necessary to
facilitate the matrix multiplication to the q electric vector. Equation 3.9 shows c water .

c water

0  Water Tower
0 
  Pump House
= 0  Facility 1
 
0  Facility 2
0  Heat Plant

(3.9)

With Equation 3.8, we now have c electricwater (see Equation 3.10) which describes
the scenario vector to apply to the next infrastructure analysis. This vector is significant
as it accounts for both the original inoperabilities from scenario vector c and any
calculated inoperabilities from the previous step’s infrastructure analysis. The operation
presented in Equation 3.8 maps inter-layer dependendencies and allows for the multilayer modeling.

celectric → water

0  Water Tower
1 
  Pump House
= 1  Facility 1
 
1  Facility 2
1  Heat Plant

3.4.3.3 Step 3 – Subsequent IIM Calculation.
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(3.10)

Using the new scenario vector c electric water , Equation 3.2 is solved for the
appropriate infrastructure layer. In the present example, this is the water infrastructure
layer.

−1

I − A(D)water T  celectric → water
q water =

 0  Water Tower
1  Pump House
 
 2  Facility 1
=
  Facility 2
2
 2  Heat Plant

(3.11)

3.4.3.4 Step 4 – Repeat Steps 2 and 3 for Remaining Layers.
For the present example, only the heating infrastructure layer remains. Therefore,

c water →=
I water →heating ⋅ q water
heating
T

 2  Heat Plant
 2  Facility 1
+ c=
heating
 
 2  Facility 2

(3.12)

where I waterheating is from Figure 7 and transposed, q water is from Equation 3.11, and
c heating is the zero vector for the three nodes that comprise the heating infrastructure layer.
The final iteration results in:
−1

T
q heating =
I − A(D)heating  c water →heating

 2  Heat Plant
  Facility 1
=
(3.13)
4
 4  Facility 2

3.4.3.5 Step 5 – Compile Final Results.
The final results of the analysis should follow the results from the twodimensional matrix analysis from Equation 3.5. Collecting the q-vectors from the multidimensional analysis leads to the series of vectors in Equation 3.14, and collecting the
maximum scalar value for each node results in q final for Equation 3.15.

60

q electric

1
1

= 1

1
1

Substation
Pump House
Facility 1
Facility 2
Heat Plant

q water

0
1 
 
= 2
 
2
 2 

0
1 
 
1 
q final= q=  
2
4
 
4

Water Tower
Pump House
Facility 1
Facility 2

q heating

2
=  4 
 4 

Heat Plant
Facility 1

(3.14)

Facility 2

Heat Plant

Water Tower
Pump House
Substation
Heat Plant

(3.15)

Facility 1
Facility 2

The results in Equation 3.15 show that the final damage vector, q final , matches the results
of the IIM calculations from Equation 3.5 and demonstrates that the proposed multi-layer
method transfers inoperabilities using layered data.
3.5 Results and Findings
The proposed approach is significant in several ways. First, the results of q final
can be applied to take advantage of the visual display functions of a GIS. The cartograph
in Figure 9 colors each facility based on the coding derived from q final . By
communicating the results visually, the method presented now becomes a valuable tool to
concisely relay the system’s needs for maintenance, additional redundancy, or areas of
high risk. Further, given the vastness of infrastructures and the ability of a GIS to store
or integrate data, the method can easily be used to display interoperability information on
a grander scale. Therefore, the method is generalizable for larger and more complex
systems.
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Figure 9. Example cartograph for results of system simulation with substation outage.

Second, the original formulation of the IIM, as well as subsequent studies using
the model, relied heavily on economic databases to determine the inoperability matrix.
With advances in GIS coupled with its wide spread use by infrastructure asset managers
in inventorying and locating their assets, data is readily accessible which contain the
topology of built infrastructure networks. Therefore, network analysis can be conducted
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at the component level of infrastructure systems rather than abstracted at high levels, such
as in the original IIM. Modeling and analysis at component levels allows for greater
understanding of the system and associated interdependency effects.
Third, the multi-layer framework of the model abolishes the need for a single, two
dimensional matrix and the “large” network that accompanies it. Rather, multiple
matrices are employed in defining the network as discrete layers, and this allows for
network modeling according to infrastructure type. The infrastructures are tied together
with mapping layers capturing interdependent relationships. Such a framework
acknowledges the many layers of complex infrastructure networks (Amin, 2002) and
makes use of the layered data structure common in GIS platforms. The proposed model
provides a way to aggregate layers should infrastructure data be fragmented or siloed
across different organizations, a common occurrence in infrastructure management
(Halfawy, 2010; Rasdorf et al., 2009; Shen et al., 2010).
Fourth, the multi-layer framework relieves some difficulty in discerning network
topology. Digitization processes of infrastructure assets may not accurately capture
network topology or, in some cases, spatial data may not contain any topological
relationships (i.e., the “spaghetti” data model). In fact, Figure 9 illustrates part of this
problem where the visual representation is a perplexing jumble of distribution lines for
the simple example. Although tools exist that automate the calculation of topologies, the
process is generally inefficient (Curtain, 2007) and often results in errors. Basic spatial
adjustment commands such as snapping and crossing rules may result in unintended
junctions or omission of junctions. The proposed method emphasizes modeling within
individual infrastructures and reduces the possibility of errors since the set of edges and
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nodes an analyst must model at a single time is reduced. A more accurate representation
of the infrastructure results which leads to more sound modeling and analysis.
Finally, the proposed model provides a solution to the problem of cycles and
loops. The core operation of matrix inversion, (I – A)-1, may not be possible due to the
existence of cycles and loops which may create singular matrices. For instance, consider
Figure 10(a) which depicts a looped infrastructure. (I – A) creates a singular matrix for
which the inversion does not exist. Therefore, the calculation of Equation 3.2 cannot be
carried out. As another example, Figure 10(b) demonstrates the example infrastructure as
a single network with a modification to include an edge from the heat plant to the
substation. This added edge forms cycles within the example system and application of
the IIM method to this network model results in a negative determinant for (I – A).
Negative values appear in the q vector and these inoperability values have no immediate
interpretation.

Figure 10. Networks with cycles are indeterminate with the IIM.
(a) A generic looped infrastructure. (b) The example
system with an added edge now contains cycles.
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To solve both cases, elimination of cycles and loops is necessary. In the former
case, modeling the looped system acyclically, as in Figure 11(a), eliminates these loops.
For the latter case, the proposed multi-layer model and accompanying algorithm
eliminates the effect of the existing cycle. The model decomposes Figure 10(b) into
individual, layered infrastructures and reveals in Figure 11(b) that the added edge in the
heating layer no longer results in a cycle. The proposed algorithm performs the matrix
inversions on acyclic systems, transfers results through the mapping layers, returns an
interpretable q-vector, and therefore permits interdependency analysis on multi-layered
infrastructure systems.

Figure 11. Modeling networks acyclically.
(a) An acyclic looped infrastructure. (b) Decomposition
of the example problem reveals branched networks.

3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a network analysis method for the modeling and study of
infrastructure system behavior. Rather than limiting the scope of the modeling to a single
infrastructure network, the model maintains distinct infrastructure layers and uses a
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mapping a layer to capture network interdependencies within the system. Given that
network analysis in GISs are mostly limited to shortest path problems, the method in this
paper offers an alternative analysis technique of infrastructures outside of finding the
shortest path. In addition, several key findings are presented.
•

Coupling GIS with the modeling method provides a powerful tool in
describing network interdependencies

•

GIS allows for interoperability network analysis to be conducted at the
system component level rather than abstracting to higher levels, as in
many IIM studies

•

The model’s multi-layer framework abolishes the need to create a single,
“large” network and leverages the layered data model of a GIS to
aggregate infrastructure data

•

The model’s multi-layer framework allows for more accurate modeling of
network topology

•

The model provides a solution to the problem of matrix inversion when
cycles and loops are present

Future research includes integrating this model as a tightly coupled analysis
module within a GIS software platform. Currently, shortest path solvers are provided
within common GIS packages and development of a tool to easily conduct
interdependency analysis will enhance the network analysis capabilities of a GIS.
Second, the visual representation of interdependency modeling could be further explored
as a GIS is a powerful visual tool that communicates its findings via annotated maps.
Third, the model could be extended to explore non-Boolean representation of network
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adjacencies. Such an extension would explore the effect of representing differing
connection strengths through percentages or weighted edges. Finally, the proposed
model and example problem largely address physical interdependencies and do not
explore the other dimensions of interdependency as defined by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and
Kelly (2001). The interdependency types of logical, cyber, and geographic could also be
explored with the proposed method.

67

IV. Modeling Interdependent Infrastructures in Asset Management with the
Input-output Inoperability Model 3

4.1 Introduction
Infrastructure systems provide the basic underpinnings of modern society by
ensuring essential goods and services are delivered to the people they serve. These
systems are typically ignored and taken for granted by the public until there is a system
failure (Roberts, Hughson, Smith, McIlveen, & Murray, 2006) which results in a
degradation or outage of service. Infrastructure asset managers are charged with ensuring
the proper functioning of these systems, but are faced with the task of managing and
maintaining aging systems. The degradation of built infrastructures decreases their
ability to reliably serve the public and so professional organizations and governments
have highlighted the need for more emphasis on these systems. For example, the
American Society of Civil Engineers regularly publicizes the degraded state of the United
States infrastructure system (Powell, 2010) and the U.S. government has been working
since the early 1990s to protect these infrastructures at the national level (President's
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1996).
One method to understand infrastructure is through the characterization of these
systems as networks. In networks, related system components are represented as nodes
and the relationships between them as edges. Nodes produce, consume, or pass along
resources to other nodes while edges are the pathways that these resources take to and
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The contents of this chapter will be independently submitted for publication by Valencia, Colombi,
Sitzabee, and Thal to the Journal of Management in Engineering.

68

from nodes. As modern infrastructures have become more interlinked in recent decades,
understanding an infrastructure’s network properties has become more important as we
realize our understanding of cascading effects from infrastructure disruptions is not well
understood (Zimmerman & Restrepo, 2009).
The National Research Council (2005) reported that the study of networks as a
science and its applications to technological and social systems is still, however, in its
nascent stages. Some early applications of network science to built infrastructures can be
found in the literature. For example, some researchers explore the meaning of
topological network properties such as degree connectedness, clustering coefficients, and
characteristic path length for use in risk and vulnerability analysis (e.g., Dueñas-Osorio,
Craig, Goodno, & Bostrom, 2007; Lewis, 2006) whereas others demonstrate the
application of network science to existing infrastructures (e.g., Al Mannai, 2008; DueñasOsorio, Craig, & Goodno, 2007; Dueñas-Osorio, Craig, Goodno, & Bostrom, 2007;
Nozick, Turnquist, Jones, Davis, & Lawton, 2004). These papers focus primarily on the
application of network techniques to the protection of critical infrastructure systems from
vulnerabilities such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
One source of vulnerability to infrastructure systems is decay through aging, but
studies into the issues of infrastructure aging are not well represented in the literature.
Some initial work has begun, one example being the Aging Infrastructure Workshop
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (Doyle & Betti, 2010). The
workshop acknowledged the role that decay contributes towards increasing risk to
infrastructure systems. Topics of the workshop varied widely from the general, present
conditions of the nation’s infrastructure, to broad ideas such as the economic and social
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impacts of infrastructure failure, to more technical domains such as structural health
monitoring and decision-making methodologies. This collection of works illustrates the
need to better understand infrastructure aging.
This chapter strives to further the research of infrastructure systems as networked
systems as well as provide a method which addresses infrastructure aging. It proposes to
provide insight into interdependency analysis of infrastructure distribution systems at a
municipality level. The organization of the chapter is as follows. First, a brief discussion
on networks as applicable to infrastructure systems is presented. The degree sequence
distribution, which is a key descriptor of network structure, and infrastructure
interdependencies are discussed as these two concepts lead to a method in identifying
critical network components. Next, a method is proposed which is a modification of the
input-output inoperability model (IIM). The IIM has primarily been used to study
economic interdependencies, but the modified method proposes that physical and
geographic interdependencies can be modeled and understood to provide insight into the
effects of aging components on an infrastructure system. Finally, the data acquired is
briefly described and the paper closes by applying the method and discussing the results
of the work.
4.2 Network Analysis in Infrastructure
4.2.1 Network Structure.
There are generally four classes of networks: regular networks, small-world
networks, scale-free networks, and random networks (Lewis, 2009). Each of these
network classes have their own unique properties. Regular networks have zero
randomness in their structure, so the number of connections and the pattern of these
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connections is the same and predictable for all nodes across the system. Random
networks have no discernible structure as the connections between nodes are completely
random. Scale-free networks are characterized by having a small number of nodes with a
high number of links, and small world networks are characterized by the existence of
node “neighborhoods” that are connected through intermediary nodes.
In describing the network connections for nodes across all four classes of
networks, the degree sequence distribution provides some interesting properties for the
different classes of networks. Based on the node degree, which is a count of the
connections for any given node, the degree sequence distribution is a histogram that plots
the percentage of nodes with a particular degree against a list of all the degrees in the
system. In a regular network, the degree sequence distribution is a uniform distribution
of 100% for a single degree since the number of connections of every node will be that
degree. In a random network, this distribution follows the binomial distribution since the
number of connections for any given node is completely random. For small-world
networks, the degree sequence distribution is similar to that of a binomial distribution,
but with a taller and thinner shape for the histogram plot. Finally, in scale-free networks,
the degree sequence distribution follows a power law distribution which indicates the
existence of network “hubs” where a small fraction of nodes have a high number of
connections.
For built infrastructures, scale-free and small-world networks are commonly used
to describe the structure of these systems. Lewis (2006) finds that critical infrastructure
systems such as the internet, railroads, interstate transportation, and gas and oil pipelines
have structures that classify them as scale-free networks. Within these networks are a
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handful of hubs which are connected to an overwhelmingly large share of nodes
compared to the average node. Within the interstate transportation network, for example,
Lewis (2006) suggests that major cities represent hubs as they have many more interstate
connections relative to smaller sized cities and towns. For small-world networks, Lewis
(2006) finds that the national power grid forms clusters of nodes (neighborhoods) and
thus can be classified as a small-world network. By identifying the structure of the
network, it is then possible to identify critical hubs or critical node clusters which could
form the basis for management and maintenance policies for built infrastructure systems.
4.2.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies.
Along with network structure, another important concept in understanding
infrastructure networks is the characterization of network interdependencies. Work by
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) has facilitated research in infrastructure networks
by providing the basic definitions of infrastructure interdependencies. To begin,
interdependencies differ from dependencies based on whether or not the relationship
between two entities is reciprocal. That is, an infrastructure dependency between two
systems exists if flow from one system to the next occurs in a single direction. Outputs
from System A are inputs to System B and B does not reciprocate to A. System B is
dependent on System A and flow occurs in a single direction from A to B. An
infrastructure interdependency, on the other hand, is bi-directional for these two systems
where the infrastructure outputs are mutually relied upon by the infrastructure systems, or
elements of the systems. Although conceptually simple, the idea of interdependencies
increases system complexity as behaviors are created which are not intuitively
predictable.
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Furthering their definition of interdependency, Rinalidi at al. (2001) establish four
classes of interdependencies. Physical interdependencies are relationships based on the
material outputs from one infrastructure being passed to another as a material input.
These infrastructures pass physical products that are used as resources to each other. For
example, an electrical generation plant provides electricity to a water station pump house
which reciprocates by delivering water to the plant for cooling. Degradation of one
system affects the flow of physical objects in the interdependent relationship, thereby
affecting both systems.
Cyber interdependencies exist when information is the entity being passed
between infrastructures. Modern infrastructures are heavily reliant on information
technology for their operation and monitoring. Supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems that allow for the remote control and monitoring of industrial and
infrastructure processes are examples of cyber interdependencies. To affect systems with
a cyber interdependency, one would have to influence the flow of information for these
systems.
Geographic interdependencies are based on physical proximity. These systems
are spatially situated such that a localized event affects the status of these infrastructures.
Severe weather, explosions, and accidents are examples of events that might affect the
status of geographically interdependent systems. The physical effects of the event might
manifest itself as damage to system components within the same geographic area and
result in disruption in service for the infrastructures affected.
Logical interdependencies exist between infrastructures when there is a reciprocal
relationship that is (1) neither physical, cyber, nor geographical and (2) is described
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through logical reasoning. For example, if “government” is described as an infrastructure
system, this system creates policies and plans in the management and operation of
physical infrastructure systems. Reductions in maintenance and repair budgets would
degrade the service delivery of these systems, yet “government” relies on these systems
in order to continue operations. Government does not provide physical resources to other
systems, meaning there is no physical interdependency; nor does it provide data as a
resource, meaning there is no cyber interdependency; and finally it may not be near other
systems, meaning there is no geographical interdependency. It does nonetheless impact
the operation and delivery of infrastructure systems under its authority and through
reasoning, a logical interdependency between government and other infrastructure is
defined.
This interdependency framework provides the basis for modeling and simulation
methods that might link different infrastructure systems. Whether it is a physical
infrastructure, such as a water distribution system or road network, or an abstracted,
“soft” infrastructure, such as a healthcare system or economic infrastructure, one of the
four interdependency types will describe the interconnection between two or more
systems. Combined with the understanding of the network structure of scale-free or
small-world for infrastructure systems, methods can be developed that identify the critical
nodes in a system of multiple, interconnected networks.
Finding such methods is particularly salient for infrastructure systems as these
systems are nearing, or have surpassed, their expected useful life. One particular
challenge is the limited resources available for the operations and maintenance of the
systems. Infrastructure systems are large and geographically expansive with many
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components. Rarely is it the case that all necessary resources are provided to ensure the
infrastructures are in perfect working order. Rather, some deterioration is accepted by
both infrastructure managers and the general public with repair prioritization being the
general philosophy. Understanding interdependency effects within a system of
infrastructure systems will aid in identifying the most important components towards
developing a prioritized maintenance and repair policy, as well as policies regarding the
mitigation of cascading failures resulting from network interdependencies.
4.3 IIM Overview
The method that we propose to understand interdependency effects is a
modification of the input-output inoperability method (IIM) (Haimes & Jiang, 2001;
Haimes, 2009). Based on the Leontief input-output economic model of
interdependencies, the IIM captures the spread of the “risk of inoperability” in a
networked system through matrix algebra operations. One key to the model is the
introduction of node inoperabilities. The idea of inoperability is likened to reliability – a
particular network component is assigned a percentage that illustrates its probability of
failure – but unlike reliability, inoperability also describes node interdependency. In
Figure 12, Nodes A and B are dependent on each other (i.e., interdependent). If Node A
were to fail, Node B would lose 40% of its operating capacity; and if Node B were to fail,
Node A would lose 60% of its operating capacity. For this example, the IIM would
assign the edge from A to B a weight of 0.4 and the edge from B to A a weight of 0.6.
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Figure 12. Interdependency for a two-node network.

In any system, the connections between nodes can be captured in a weighted
adjacency matrix. Such a matrix would be a square matrix with the column and row
indices being the node labels and each entry being the weight of the adjacency. For the
example in Figure 12, the adjacency matrix would be a 2 x 2 matrix with a total of four
entries. Adjacency matrices can be scaled up as any network topology can be captured in
this simple, two dimensional construct. By mathematically capturing the network
topology in matrix form, the IIM can model the effects of node interdependencies
through basic matrix operations.
To understand the effect of a perturbation in a network, two additional
components to the model are needed. First, an input to the system is required which
models a network disturbance. In the IIM, this disturbance is illustrated through a
column vector, called the scenario vector, whose entries are a list of the network nodes.
An entry greater than zero indicates some level of inoperation (i.e., failure) for that
particular node. For example, an entry of 0.5 would indicate 50% inoperation of a
particular node (or 50% operability) while an entry of 1.0 would indicate 100%
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inoperation (or complete failure of that node). Second, the output for the system, called
the damage vector, which is also a column vector, lists the results for each network node.
Interpreted in the same manner as the scenario vector, the damage vector is the resulting
inoperabilities from application of the scenario vector. In compact matrix form, the IIM
model is,
q = A ⋅q + c

(4.1)

where A represents the interdependency A-matrix, c is the scenario vector, and q is the
resulting damage vector. The size of each component in the model is driven by the
number of nodes in the network. Therefore, an n-sized network would result in an n x n
square matrix for the interdependency A-matrix and n x 1 column vectors for the scenario
and damage vectors. Solving Equation 4.1 is simply,
q=
[I − A]−1 ⋅ c

(4.2)

where I is the n x n identity matrix.
Since the A-matrix captures network topology for any network, the IIM can be
used to study any of the four infrastructure interdependency types outlined by Rinaldi et
al. (2001). However, much of the work to date that utilizes the IIM has been in the
study of economic interdependencies between large sectors of a given economy. In fact,
Haimes (2009) describes that the adaptation of the IIM from Leonteif’s I-O model is
advantageous due to the availability of infrastructure interdependency data through two
major databases: the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Regional InputOutput Multiplier System (RIMS-II). These two databases provide detailed information
on the production and consumption of resources among differing economic sectors and
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are used as the basis for the interdependency A-matrices. Therefore, the IIM has been
primarily used in the understanding of mostly economic relationships among large
industrial sectors.
4.4 Proposed Modification to the IIM
This study departs from the customary application of the IIM to economic
interdependencies and instead analyzes physical interdependencies of smaller, localized
networks. Rather than modeling an entire infrastructure sector as a single node, this
study proposes that the IIM can be used to understand interdependency effects within
municipal level networks. To do so, however, we propose several major modifications
to the IIM model.
First, the scale of the infrastructure networks is small and the level of detail is
greater in the proposed model, compared to that of an entire economy in the IIM. Rather
than abstracting economic sectors as a node, which themselves could be networks, we
propose that each node now represents a component of a municipal infrastructure. The
level of analysis that can be achieved will be driven by the level of detail available. For
this study, the use of geospatial information system (GIS) data provides information on
facility level assets such as buildings, water towers, and substations. This smaller scale
and higher level of detail is beneficial as it accounts for individual components of the
system, thereby leading to strategies in the management of these components.
Second, the A-matrix developed for each infrastructure system is based on
physical connections between components, with each connection considered binary. In
most forms of the IIM, A-matrix entries are continuous values between 0 and 1. These
entries are typically derived from the normalization of values from the economic
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databases which record inputs and outputs between economic sectors (Haimes, 2009).
For the present study, we propose that the existence of a connection and its directionality
is sufficient to analyze physical infrastructure interdependencies. Therefore, entries in
the A-matrix are either 0 or 1, with 0 indicating no connection and 1 indicating a
physical connection. In addition, the directionality between nodes is captured such that
a 1 indicates a positive flow from a source node to a receiving node and 0 for the
reverse. In this form, the A-matrix is simply the transverse of a directional adjacency
matrix.
Third, we propose that utility lines be modeled as nodes within the system rather
than as edges. Under this construct, utility lines are viewed as components of the system
whose primary purpose is the transfer of resources to other nodes. Again, the existence
of a connection would represent an edge between two or more nodes. Modeling utility
lines in this way has two primary advantages. First, this allows the IIM to capture their
role within an interdependent network. Considering utility lines as edges excludes them
from IIM analysis as they are excluded from the adjacency matrix. Their existence is
implied through the connection of two nodes in this form of an adjacency matrix. If a
utility line is modeled as a node, however, the resulting adjacency matrix explicitly
accounts for their physical existence while still recording the resource inputs and outputs
for the line. The second advantage is that this method will account for utility line
attributes such as failure rates, age, and interdependent effects just the same as other
components in a utility system. Utility lines are a critical component of any built
infrastructure system and this third modification to the IIM allows for the capturing of
their interdependency effects in a networked system.
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With these three modifications proposed, two significant new ideas can be
introduced. First, when dealing with a single system, a new network metric based on the
count of nodes affected by a single node outage provides a measure of system
dependency for every node in the system. The calculation of the IIM for the inoperability
of a single node results in a q-vector that indicates the resulting states for each node in
the system. Using Equation 4.2, we modify the model to produce results for each node, i,
in the system:

qi =
[I − A]−1 ⋅ ci

(4.3)

such that,
 ci ,1 
 
  
1, j = i
ci =
=
ci , j 
ci , j 
 
0, j ≠ i
  
c 
 i ,n 

(4.4)

In Equations 4.3 and 4.4, the subcript i denotes the analyzed node. Therefore, c i
represents a vector that assigns an inoperable state for node i, while the remaining nodes
in the system are considered fully operable. Vector q i is the result of applying vector c i .
The elements in the resulting q i vector will either be zero, which indicates no effect from
the inoperable node, or greater than zero, which indicates that there is some effect on that
particular node. The number of resulting q i vectors is equal to the number of nodes in the
system. Thus, the results from inoperation of each node in the system can be analyzed.
To measure the level of dependency for a given node, a count of the affected
nodes in each calculation is derived from each q i -vector result. Any element with a value
greater than zero is added to this count and the summation is calculated as,
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dep _=
score(i )

n

∑q
j =1

i, j

∀i, j

(4.5)

where q i,j is an element of the vector q i and the interdependency score, dep_score(i), is a
function of the node i whose inoperability is assigned 1. This dependency score provides
a metric for the number of nodes affected in the network and provides a means for
evaluating the importance of a node relative to another node through the identification of
the physical interdependency levels of each node.
The second significant idea proposed is the ability to identify geographic
interdependencies strictly from the results of the interdependency score. Owing to the
use of GIS data, the location of the most critical system components can be visually
depicted through the normalization of the physical interdependencies determined from
Equation 4.5. Therefore, we propose a second metric called the geographic
interdependency score to be:
=
geo _ score(i )

dep _ score(i )
max[dep _ score]

∀i

(4.6)

where max[dep_score] is the maximum of all dependency scores for all nodes in the
system. Through normalization, the resulting values can be used to render the vector data
of each component in a GIS system. The results of this process highlight the differing
levels of physical interdependencies and provide a visual method for identifying
geographic interdependencies.
To address the impact of aging infrastructure systems, Monte Carlo simulation
can be used with the IIM to simulate the inoperation of each node in the system according
to some pre-determined distribution function. Given that each c i vector only has one
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inoperable node, applying a distribution function to the vector is simply a matter of
applying a distribution function to the node of interest, c i,j , as in Equation 4.7.
 ci ,1 
 
  
 F (t ), j = i
ci (t ) =
=
ci , j  j
ci , j 
 
 0, j ≠ i
  
c 
 i ,n 

∀i, j

(4.7)

where F j (t) represents the cumulative distribution function unique to node j and is a
function of time, t. The distribution function should be representative of the expected
failure rates for a particular component over time. Once distribution functions are
determined for each node, the Monte Carlo simulation method can be used to first
estimate the value of the function at time, t, for node j and then calculate each
dependency score through an iterative IIM calculation for each time, t, as in Equation 4.8:

qi (t ) =
[I − A]−1 ⋅ ci (t )

(4.8)

For every node, i, and every time, t, the model produces a dependency score
which can then be plotted. Such plots show the effect of network dependencies and how
these change over some period of time. Through this modification of the IIM, we are
able to provide a dependency analysis of any infrastructure network as a function of time,
the physical interdependencies of the system, and the particular node of interest.
One final modification to the IIM can be implemented which provides an
understanding of system interdependencies. Up to this point, the IIM has been applied to
nodes within the same system. As flow for these distribution systems has been from
source to sink nodes and hence one-way, the relationships between nodes has been, by
definition, dependency relationships. There are, however, dependency relationships that
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cross infrastructure systems and which form the bi-directional relationships necessary for
interdependencies. To measure these interdependencies, we propose the introduction of
mapping layers to the IIM.
A mapping layer captures those nodes that participate in multiple systems and
thus propagates an inoperability from one system to the next. For example, a component
such as a fuel pumping station participates in both the electrical infrastructure, as it
requires electricity to operate, and the fuels infrastructure, so as to pump fuel. If an
outage were to occur in the electrical infrastructure, a dependency analysis would reveal
all the nodes that are affected within the electrical layer. This of course would identify
the pump station and a second analysis on the fuels infrastructure would be required to
identify the effects within the fuels layer. A mapping layer would integrate these two
infrastructures by identifying that the pumping station operates in both layers and
transfers an inoperability from one layer to the next, as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13. A mapping layer transfers inoperabilities.
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To incorporate this mapping layer into the proposed modifications, the mapping
layer is simply a directional adjacency matrix of nodes between two interacting layers.
The node list of one layer would compose the matrix row indices while the node list of
the second layer would compose the matrix column indices. For the scenario described
in Figure 13, the electrical layer transfers inoperabilities to the fuels layer; therefore, the
electrical node list would compose the row indices while the fuels node list would
compose the column indices. This follows typical matrix convention where the “from”
nodes comprise the row indices and the “to” nodes make-up the column indices.
To employ this mapping layer, an interim calculation is necessary which transfers
the inoperabilities from one layer to the next. Therefore, the calculations necessary to
carry out the interdependency analysis take on an iterative procedure using Equations 4.9
through 4.12,
[I − A m ]−1 ⋅ c(i ) m
q(i ) m =

(4.9)

m → m +1
c(i )=
I m→m +1 ⋅ q(i ) m

(4.10)

q(i ) m +1 =
[I − A m +1 ]−1 ⋅ c(i ) m→m +1

(4.11)


q(i ) n =
[I − A n ]−1 ⋅ c(i ) n −1→n

(4.12)

where the superscript mm+1 denotes the mapping of an inoperability from one layer,
m, to the next layer in the sequence, m+1. The vector c(i)mm+1 is the scenario vector
which captures the transfer of the inoperability from layer m to layer m+1 and is used to
calculate the q(i)m+1 damage vector. Alternating between Equations 4.10 and 4.11 is
carried out until all layers have been exhausted.
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At the conclusion of the calculation for a single node i, what remains are n
damage vectors, q(i), for each layer 1, m, m+1, …, n, resulting from the outage of this
single node, i. Collecting the results from these damage vectors, and only the maximum
result for any node appearing in multiple damage vectors, provides a final damage vector
result from the interdependency inoperability analysis of a single node. Repeating the
above procedure for each node, i, in the system provides a complete interdependency,
system-wide analysis. Similar to Equation 4.5, the summation of the collected values
provides a measure of the level of interdependency for each node; this value can then be
used to determine the relative importance of nodes throughout the entire infrastructure
system.
Through several modifications of the IIM, this study proposes that physical
dependencies can be used to identify geographic interdependencies as well as inter-layer
system interdependencies. The three modifications proposed include studying smaller,
more localized networks rather than large infrastructure sectors, capturing the physical
connections between components to comprise the A-matrix, and characterizing utility
lines as nodes in the system. These ideas together lead to two new metrics, the
dependency score and geographic interdependency score, which provide the level of
dependency or interdependency a system has for any single node. These metrics can help
identify the most critical system components, as well as geographic areas, that might
contribute to cascading effects of system failure. The next section discusses the
application of the proposed method to geographic data obtained for a system of four
infrastructures.
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4.5 Method Application and Results
Figure 14 presents a portion of the geographic data obtained on four utility
systems that provide electricity, heating and cooling, and water for a small municipality.
In addition, data was also available for the liquid fuel system that services the aerodrome
for the municipality. The area under current study is approximately 16.5 square miles in
size and contains nearly 1,700 facilities serviced by the four selected infrastructure
systems. These facilities range from multi-story office complexes to small latrines at
outdoor recreation fields.

Figure 14. Portion of GIS data with four infrastructure systems and facilities.
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ArcGIS 10.0, a common GIS platform developed and distributed by the
Environmental Systems Research Institute, was the software platform used in the storage
and display of the geospatial data obtained. In addition, Python, an open-source, object
oriented programming language, was utilized in extracting the network topology for each
system as well as executing the modified IIM model. This programming language is well
supported within ArcGIS 10.0 and served as a useful tool in the topological cleaning
needed to prepare the data. Extensive editing was necessary as the majority of utility line
endpoints did not coincide with other line endpoints or points to a facility. The data in its
original state did not model any sort of network topology, thus precluding it from
network analysis. Using Python, a series of scripts were written which edited the data to
correct topology errors, build well-formed and connected graphs, extract the resulting
topological information, and finally run the proposed IIM model. Appendix C provides
details on some of the topological corrections that were made.
After data preparation, the GIS data represented networks of physically
interdependent nodes. The network sizes varied with the heating/cooling system and
fuels distribution being rather small, while the water and electrical distribution systems
were significantly larger. Table 1 presents several metrics that are commonly used to
characterize networks (Lewis, 2009).

Table 1. Network metrics of utility systems under study.
Size
Network
Average degree
Cluster
System
(Nodes)
diameter
connectedness coefficient
Heating/cooling
33
9
1.94
0.0
Fuels distribution
56
16
1.96
0.0
Electrical system
2,788
39
2.07
0.011
Water distribution
4,331
74
1.87
0.003
87

Density
.032
.019
.00072
.00028

Table 1 provides several basic facts about the structure of the networks. First, the
magnitude of the size differences between the two small networks (heating/cooling and
fuels) and the two large networks (water and electrical) is quite dramatic. The
differences in the network sizes are measured in the metrics of size and network
diameter. Size is a count of nodes in the network and network diameter is the length of
the longest path in the system. Comparing the values of these two metrics reveals that
the two smaller networks simply service far fewer facilities and are comprised of far
fewer components than the two larger networks. Examining the differences between the
water and the electrical networks reveals that there are significant differences in the
modeling of the utility lines within the GIS data. The water layer contains more utility
line segments than the electrical layer. Whereas the electrical layer may use a single line
to represent a portion of its distribution system, the water layer may use three, four, or
five segments to represent the same equivalent length of line. The water distribution
system models more components to its network, thus the larger network size, but the two
systems service the same facilities and occupy the same general geographic area.
Second, the measures of average degree connectedness, cluster coefficient, and, to
some extent, density suggest an underlying tree structure for the four networks. Degree
connectedness, a measure of the number of edges connected to each node for each of the
networks, averages approximately 2.0. Given that each network is directional, each node
in its respective network most likely has a single incoming edge and a single outgoing
edge. This is not the case for sink and source nodes in the systems which have either a
single incoming or single outgoing edge. Accounting for sink and source nodes explains
why three of the four measures are slightly less than 2.0. The cluster coefficient measure
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provides additional evidence of the tree structure. Cluster coefficient is a measure of the
likelihood of nodes clustering together through connections to each other. The
coefficients in each of the networks are very low, with the first two being zero. A zero
cluster coefficient indicates that there are no clusters formed, that is, nodes do not have
common neighbors. The low coefficients for water and electricity indicate that some
clustering occurs, but the vast majority of nodes do not form clusters. Finally, the low
graph densities indicate extremely sparse graphs; this is in line with the density for a tree
structured network. Given the average degree connectedness, the low clustering
coefficients, and low graph densities, the underlying structure for each of the networks
can be described as a tree.
With the tree structure, a problem arises in the identification of critical nodes
when using common network topology measures such as degree centrality, degree
closeness, betweeness, and degree sequence distribution. Each of these measures can be
used to identify those nodes with the greatest connections within the network, concluding
that they play a more important role (as “hubs”) than less connected nodes. Indeed,
examination of the degree sequence distribution can identify the most connected nodes as
in Figure 15(a) for the water distribution system. The degree sequence distribution is
skewed right with the highlighting of Water Line 2725 as a single node with a relatively
high degree centrality of 16. Further examination of the identified line, however, reveals
this water line only affects 16 service lines, Figure 15(b), which in turn affect 16
facilities. Using the common centrality measures would lead one to conclude that the
identified line is the most important line in the system when, in fact, it plays a minor role
in the operation of water distribution.
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Figure 15. Analysis results using a common centrality measure.
(a) Degree connectedness histogram for water distribution.
(b) Examination of Water Line 2725 in GIS.

Applying the modified IIM reveals better identification of critical nodes in these
infrastructure systems. Figure 16 provides plots of the modified IIM results for each of
the four infrastructures systems. The horizontal axes represent individual nodes in the
networked system with each axis ordered from greatest impact to least impact. For
clarity, the labels for each system component in the figure are replaced with its ordering
number. Therefore, Node 1 in each analysis will have the greatest impact among all
nodes within its respective infrastructure system. The top two plots provide the results
for all nodes in the system while the bottom two represent only the top third scoring
nodes due to the sheer number of components. The vertical axes are the interdependency
scores derived from Equation 4.5. These scores represent the total number of nodes
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affected by each node in the system. The greater the score, the greater the impact a
particular node has within the system.

Figure 16. Interdependency analysis results.

The shape of the plots among all four systems is similar to that of Figure 15(a).
This shows scale-free structure within the network and indicates the existence of network
hubs (i.e., nodes with the highest degree connectedness within the network). The tree
structure in all four of the infrastructure systems, however, leads to very few hubs which
are in fact not at all critical. Instead, the modified IIM method properly identifies the
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source nodes, and immediately adjacent nodes, as the most critical nodes, since all
resources flow through these nodes. An inoperability in these nodes affects the greatest
number of nodes in the system. Therefore, the scale-free structure of the bar charts in
Figure 16 indeed indicate the existence of hubs, but these hubs are a result of the indirect
connections to other nodes in the network.
Using the results to identify geographic interdependencies leads to Figure 17.
The figure was created by applying Equation 4.6 to normalize each dependency score and
then applying a coloring scheme to identify the highest scoring nodes. The figure
suggests that critical components for the fuels and electrical systems are geographically
separated, while critical components for the water and heating/cooling systems display a
geographic interdependency. Such an identified interdependency should lead analysts to
explore the effects of one system on the other should failures, such as line breaks, in that
area occur. One issue with the method of visual display of geospatial data is that larger
sized components will receive more weight in their criticality than smaller components.
That is, there are several high scoring facilities within the mapping area that cannot be
seen due to their small geographic area relative to the area traversed by the utility lines.
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Figure 17. Identification of critical nodes and geographic interdependencies.

In another application, the method can be used to analyze the impact that
interdependencies might have on aging assets. Using Equations 4.7 and 4.8, the impact
of the failure for a particular node on a network can be plotted given a particular failure
distribution. In the data collected, the build dates of various components and facilities of
the system provided a starting point for the analysis since the age of each node provides
an idea of the level of decay for that component. That is, the greater the age, the greater
the likelihood of failure due to decay. Other data were required to be simulated,
93

however. In particular, the cumulative distribution function for each component was
assumed to be the Weibull distribution with a scale parameter of either 67 years for a
facility or 100 years for a part of the distribution system. These values are generally
accepted useful lifetimes for facilities and infrastructure systems (GAO, 2003; Hudson et
al., 1997). Additionally, facilities and infrastructure managers accept that their systems
are in a constant state of deterioration (Stewardship of federal facilities, 1998; Rush,
1991) and therefore aging can assume an increasing failure rate over time. Taking this
into account, the Weibull shape parameter of 3.0 was subjectively chosen in the absence
of data that might lead to any other specified value.
Given the establishment of decay distributions for every node, i, in the system, a
Monte Carlo simulation approach can be applied in order to produce Figure 18. A
sampling procedure of 1,000 trials for the Weibull distributions generates estimates of the
inoperabilities for each node at each time, t. A time step of 0.1 years is established for
the 40-year period and the estimated inoperabilities are used as entries into the c i (t)vectors for every node. The resulting q i (t)-vector outputs are column summed, as in
Equation 4.5, and plotted. This approach takes into account a network’s topology along
with component failure distributions to produce plots in order to show changes in node
inoperability scores for each of four systems over a 40-year period.
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Figure 18. Results from Monte Carlo and the modified IIM simulation.

Figure 18 provides some insight into the changing interdependency effects as a
function of time. Three of the four plots show a clear delineation of the most important
nodes in the system and the predicted future impacts given the reliability functions for
each node. The results for the water distribution system are not as clear due to the large
number of nodes under analysis, but subsets of the water system could be isolated for
more detailed study. Such results could be used in defining long-term management plans
identifying critical components and the points in time in which they should be
refurbished or replaced. Additionally, changing the scale of the study to a shorter term
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outlook would provide clarity on immediate likelihoods of failure and the impact on the
overall system.
Finally, the inter-layer interdependency method introduced in Equations 4.9
through 4.12 returns a set of integrated results displayed in Figure 19. With this final
output, the effects of the interdependencies of nodes across each of the four infrastructure
systems is captured. Whereas Figure 16 shows that the maximum scores for the electrical
and water system inoperabilities are approximately 600 and 250, respectively, Figure 19
shows that the maximum score for the most critical nodes in the inter-layer analysis are
nearly 1,800. This is a significant departure from the results of any of the single layer
analyses. The large increase is explained through the transfer of inoperabilities from
system to system. The mapping layer mathematically integrates each of the disparate
infrastructures and the analysis, therefore, treats all four networks as a single system.
Extracting the top scoring nodes in this analysis reveals that the most important
nodes are the series of lines that feed into the municipality’s electrical substation and the
electrical substation itself. A natural break occurs in the data where the inoperability
scores drop precipitously, thereby identifying nodes with a lesser inoperability impact.
The nodes to the left of this break are classified as Group I and the nodes to the right are
classified as Group II. The nodes in Group II are a mix of water infrastructure
components and electrical components. Additional natural breaks can be found, and this
risk analysis identifies three distinct groups of nodes. The inter-layer interdependency
method is significant in that it relates all nodes within the four infrastructure systems
equitably and provides a method for scoring their inoperability impact. This final method
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is useful as it equates disparate infrastructure systems and reveals those components with
the greatest impact to their systems regardless of the infrastructure type.

Figure 19. Full system interdependency analysis using the multi-layer IIM method.

4.6

Findings and Conclusion
The model presented in this work attempts to advance the state and understanding

of network analysis techniques on built infrastructure systems by exploring physical and
geographic interdependencies of a system of four infrastructures. These
interdependencies were explored through several modifications of the IIM model. First,
the model simplifies the interdependency A-matrix to Boolean entries only. Second,
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utility lines within the system are considered as nodes within the matrix, rather than
edges; physical connections within the utility are then represented as edges. Third, a
dependency score is utilized and quantifies the level of interdependency a particular node
contributes to the system. Finally, this dependency score is the basis for geographic
interdependency results and is central to a Monte Carlo simulation method which
provides possible insight as to how interdependency effects might change over time.
Geospatial data on a system of four infrastructures were obtained for a small
municipality and the results from the application of the method were presented. Several
key findings are highlighted here as a result of the work.
•

Simplification of the interdependency A-matrix facilitates the use of
geospatial data alone to conduct an interdependency analysis.

•

Modeling utility lines as nodes within a network provides a method which
accounts for their role as interdependent components.

•

The systems are found to be tree network structures and current network
methods do not account for the importance of source nodes; the modified IIM
identifies these source nodes as critical components.

•

Importing model results back into a GIS platform provides a means to visually
display results and aids in identifying geographic interdependencies.

•

Applying Monte Carlo simulation to the modified IIM provides a means to
project future maintenance requirements on aging systems, but asset
management organizations must deliberately develop and maintain the
necessary reliability data for their components.
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There are several opportunities for future work regarding the modified IIM
method. First, the model discounts the effect of facilities to a larger network and treats
facilities as sink nodes where branches of the tree network end. An adaptation of the
model which accounts for a facility’s relative importance to a larger system will aid in the
area of facilities management. Second, extensive topological cleaning was necessary to
prepare the data for use in the model. As this dataset is representative of other geospatial
data on utilities, development of algorithms that transform this data into topologically
connected data will aid future network analysis methods on utility systems. Third,
identification of geographic interdependencies in this work was limited to a visual
analysis after importing model results back into a GIS platform. Applying known spatial
analysis methods to these results might produce a quantitative means in identifying
geographic interdependencies.
The proposed method presented herein provides a means to leverage existing
geospatial data which identifies physical and geographic interdependencies within
infrastructure systems. The method can also account for infrastructure decay effects on
these networked systems. This paper models physical infrastructures as networked
systems and strives to further the research in this area.
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V. Conclusion

This final chapter is a summary of the research effort. It begins with a section
that briefly addresses each of the research objectives posed as a question at the beginning
of the study. Next, the significant findings and key contributions resulting from the work
are discussed. Finally, recommendations for future work are provided.
5.1

Research Objectives
At the beginning of this research, the objectives to be addressed were developed

such that the overall work had a focused area of study within infrastructure management.
Infrastructure managers are coming to understand that decay is just as relevant a threat as
extreme weather and purposeful attacks. In using network techniques to model built
infrastructures, some insights have been gained, as well as a new model proposed, that
might lead to better management of infrastructure systems. The research objectives
leading to these conclusions were posed as questions in Section 1.4 and are briefly
answered here.
•

How can risk to infrastructure be quantitatively modeled?
Modifications to the input-output inoperability model (IIM) were developed
that allowed for its applicability to lower-level infrastructures (i.e., secondary
distribution systems) where network topology was captured strictly with
geographic information system (GIS) data. With this network topology, the
modified IIM can be implemented to provide a measure for the criticality of a
component to the overall system. The metrics introduced identify those
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components which are most critical to the system and, therefore, represent a
greater source of risk than other components.
•

What aspects of networked systems (that is, what metrics) are applicable
towards infrastructure risk analysis?
Conventional network metrics such as degree connectedness, cluster
coefficient, and network density were found to have limited utility when
applied to actual data on built infrastructures. Each system was found to have
a tree network structure; therefore, these metrics offered little information in
the way of critical components. The modified IIM created new metrics in
identifying critical components.

•

How do interdependencies of networks affect this analysis?
Four types of infrastructure interdependencies are defined in the literature and
this work explored analyzing two of these: physical and geographic. This
study found that GIS data can facilitate the analysis of physical
interdependencies, which leads to identifying geographic interdependencies.
Several problems were identified in understanding interdependencies with the
original IIM and these problems and their solutions are highlighted as a key
contribution.

•

How can the concept of infrastructure decay be modeled and simulated so as
to produce a valid infrastructure network risk model?
This research found that the principles of Monte Carlo simulation can be
applied to the modified IIM to produce results that might predict impacts of
decay from components onto the larger system. Additionally, this research
101

suggests that modeling the utility lines as nodes in a network offers a more
informed model as these lines also have decay properties. One issue
discovered, however, is that infrastructure asset management organizations
must maintain decay data at the individual component level to be able to
understand infrastructure decay at the aggregated network level.
5.2

Significant Findings and Key Contributions
This section describes the significant findings and key contributions of the

research. Although the focus of the study was very specific in its modeling and
application, the outcomes might aid infrastructure asset managers as they develop and
choose those policies which lead to better maintenance and management practices as their
systems continue to age. Six findings and contributions are discussed here.
First, the simplification of the IIM model allows for the modeling of
interdependencies and their effects in a networked system. Reducing elements of the
interdependency matrix to Boolean values transforms the matrix to a directional
adjacency matrix. This has the dual advantage of eliminating the reliance of IIM
modeling on economic data, such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis data or the
Regional Input-Output Multiplier System, and instead leverages the network topology
contained within GIS systems. Additionally, the research found that GIS systems have
the ability to solve network problems of a specific type: the shortest path problem. The
modified IIM is a different type of network problem that GIS may be used to solve.
Second, the study reveals that secondary distribution systems represent tree
network structures and that conventional network analysis methods do not account for the
criticality of source nodes. One method, the degree sequence distribution, however,
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provided insight into finding critical components and was adapted into the modified IIM.
In a network with hubs, the scale-free shape of the degree sequence distribution leads to
identifying the most critical components. By building a similar histogram based on the
results of the modified IIM, this same idea of hubs in a scale-free network provides a
method in identifying “hubs” in a tree network. Although these hubs’ physical
connections were few, they have many indirect connections to other nodes in the network
and, therefore, have the greatest impact on the system. These nodes are then identified as
the most critical.
Third, the modeling of utility lines as nodes within a network, rather than as
network edges, further informs the model by accounting for their role as interdependent
components of the system. The modified IIM allows for this since the interdependency
matrix captures a physical connection. Additionally, GIS data is already collected on
each utility line allowing for the modeling of these lines as nodes.
Fourth, this research finds that applying Monte Carlo simulation to the proposed
model provides a means for projecting future maintenance requirements on aging
systems. Specifically, failure distributions assigned to each node in the system facilitates
the calculation of the effect of that node over time. Applying Monte Carlo simulation
leads to insights on changes to system risk over time. However, the research found that
the infrastructure literature and asset management organizations suffer from a lack of data
on the reliability of infrastructure components.
Fifth, a multi-layer model is proposed for analysis of multiple infrastructure
systems as a single system. This research finds that a significant problem in
understanding interdependencies with the original IIM was the model’s limitation of
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representing an infrastructure network as a single, two-dimensional array. This had the
problem of creating a very large and sparse matrix for a system composed of several
infrastructures. To address this problem, the modified IIM leveraged the layered data
structure of GIS systems to maintain the individual network systems. To integrate these
systems together, the concept of a mapping layer was introduced which mapped
components that appeared in differing infrastructures to one another. This mapping
transferred inoperability effects from one layer to another and eliminated the need for a
large, single matrix
Finally, the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems naturally introduces
cycles and loops within the system. These cycles and loops create the problem of noninvertability of the model and this work presented a solution to the problem through the
multi-layer framework. In maintaining the separation between infrastructure systems, an
iterative calculation method was necessary to carry out the modified IIM. In addition to
utilizing the mapping layer between infrastructure systems, the modified IIM was able to
be calculated for all nodes and network layers and was able to account for
interdependencies across multiple systems.
5.3

Recommendations for Future Research
There are several recommendations for future research as a result of the work

contained in this study. Many of these recommendations were briefly provided in
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and are reintroduced and elaborated in this section. A total of five
reccommendations for the direction of future work are offered.
First, the gap in data availability for infrastructrue component reliability is found
to be a limitation in the study of infrastrucutre decay. To integrate Monte Carlo
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simulaton into the modified IIM, the reliabilities for each component in the system were
estimated. Engineering data on component reliabilities were not available with the GIS
data and, as such, the reliabilities were estimated in order to demonstrate the model’s
applicability with Monte Carlo simulation. Although development of component-level
decay data for each component of an infrastructure system represents a significant
challenge, understanding decay impacts of a networked system might be severely limited
without such data.
Next, integrating the modified IIM model as an analysis module within GIS
software platforms might be explored. As current methods available within GIS already
solve shortest path problems, the possibility exists that GIS has the ability to solve a
modified IIM as an integrated module. Doing so has the advantage of developing visual
representation methods which display the IIM results. GIS systems are prevalent tools in
the maintenance and management of infrastructure systems and integration of the IIM
provides asset managers with a means for implementing the method.
The external effect of sink nodes in the system is another suggestion for future
work. In the model, facilities are represented as sink nodes where the transfer of
inoperabilities terminate. Since facilities do not transfer inoperabilities, the model
discounts their role within the network as non-critical nodes. However, facilities play an
important role external to the physical network and provide services or complete work
necessary to the larger system. An adaptation of the model which accounts for a
facility’s importance to the larger system will aid in facilities management. Such
adaptations might include exploring the two interdependencies not explored in this study:
cyber and logical interdependencies.
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Next, algorithms which address the lack of network topology within GIS data
should be explored. Extensive topological cleaning was conducted to prepare the data for
use in the model. The dataset acquired is representative of geospatial data maintained by
other asset management organizations, so developing algorithms that transform this data
into topologically connected data will aid in future network analysis methods.
Finally, exploring known spatial analysis techniques to results of the IIM model
might better inform asset managers regarding geographic interdpendencies. In the
current work, geographic interdependencies were identified visually after importing the
model reults back into the GIS platform. Exploring spatial analysis on these results has
two advantages. First, these techinques are readily available in common GIS platforms
and, second, such techniques might produce a quantitative means to identify geographic
interdpendencies.
Each of these research suggestions represent areas in the current work that would
benefit from additional exploration. Along with these recommendations, the objectives
of the research, and the key findings and contributions of the research were outlined.
Together, the sections of this chapter summarized the overall research effort into the
network analysis of built infrastructure systems.
Infrastructure systems have a significant impact on the world as they serve as the
basic underpinnings of modern society. As current infrastructures age, there will be an
increase on the emphasis for the proper management and maintenance for these systems.
This research contributes towards that effort in its comprehensive network modeling of
infrastructure risk and offers a sound method in understanding network interdependencies
for built infrastructure systems.
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Appendix A. Literature Review on Systems Engineering
and Asset Management 4

This appendix provides an overview of the literature in which an overlap between
systems engineering and infrastructure asset management occur. It demonstrates that six
systems engineering processes comprise the core processes of engineering asset
management. The work provides a perspective on the necessity of taking a systems view
in the practice of infrastructure asset management.
A.1 Introduction
In 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers released its first “Report Card
for America’s Infrastructure” in which it awarded an overall grade of “D” for the national
infrastructure. Since then, it has issued subsequent report cards in an attempt to highlight
the impending failure of the nation’s infrastructure and elevate infrastructure needs on the
U.S. national agenda (Powell, 2010). However, infrastructure systems are complex, vast,
and thus difficult to manage. Therefore, applying a systems approach to the management
of civil infrastructure is gaining acceptance within the infrastructure asset management
field (Godau, 1999; Hudson et al., 1997; Powell, 2010), but application of systems
methods, processes, and techniques is limited and varies according to infrastructure
sector. With this paper, our goal is to provide a comparative analysis of systems
engineering (SE) and asset management (AM) best practices from the past 10 years.
Specifically, we aim to show that the International Standards Organization (ISO) 15288
4

The contents of this appendix were submitted and accepted for publication as a conference paper by
Valencia, Colombi, Thal, and Sitzabee. The paper is titled “Asset management: A systems perspective”
and appears in the Proceedings of the 2011 Industrial Engineering Research Conference held in Reno, NV.
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processes, as described in the 2010 INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (v3.2)
(Haskins, 2010), can be applied to the engineering management of infrastructure.
A.2 Infrastructure Asset Management
There are many ways to define infrastructure asset management. For example,
the U.S. Department of Transportation defines asset management as a systematic process
for maintaining and operating physical assets cost-effectively through a combination of
engineering principles and sound business practices (U.S. DOT, 1999). Similarly, the
Transportation Asset Management Guide (Cambridge Systems Inc, 2002) considers the
core elements of asset management to center on the process of resource allocation to
effectively manage assets. The elements of this process consider the following tenets: an
approach that is policy driven, options and trade-offs analyses, effective service and
project delivery, decision-making based on quality information, and continuous
monitoring of the information base for feedback into updates and improvements.
Hoskins, Brint, and Strbac (1999) describe asset management as activities for the upkeep
of a given infrastructure system such as inspection, maintenance, repair, and replacement
of parts of the system network all at minimum cost. Finally, Grigg (2003) synthesizes an
asset management definition as “an information-based process used for life-cycle facility
management across organizations.” He goes on to write that important features of the
definition include an “assets” view of the infrastructure system and its components, lifecycle management, enterprise-wide use of asset management, and the use of informationbased processes and tools.
The common themes among the varying definitions lead us to offer our own
definition: “Asset management is the holistic assessment of a given infrastructure system
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using a life-cycle approach based on quality data for the purpose of optimally managing
physical assets at least cost to stakeholders.” This definition recognizes several themes.
First, there is a growing acknowledgement within the infrastructure industry that a
holistic, life-cycle view, or systems view, can provide the tools and techniques needed to
address infrastructure issues. Second, it recognizes the purpose of asset management can
only be realized with quality data about the infrastructure system. Finally, the definition
identifies that asset managers have a duty to minimize cost to stakeholders. These costs
are not only fiscal constraints on operating budgets, but should be inclusive of the entire
life-cycle cost of the system as well as intangible costs such as environmental health, loss
of public trust, and other social costs.
A.3 Systems Engineering
Similar to asset management, many authors have provided varying definitions of
systems engineering (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011). However, the International Council
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) has published a handbook that offers a description
from the synthesis of three definitions (Haskins, 2010):
Systems engineering is a discipline that concentrates on the design and
application of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves looking at
a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and all the variables and
relating the social to the technical aspect (FAA, 2006).
Systems engineering is an iterative process of top‐down synthesis, development,
and operation of a real‐world system that satisfies, in a near optimal manner, the
full range of requirements for the system (Eisner, 2002).
Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the
realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements,
and then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while
considering the complete problem: operations, cost and schedule, performance,
training and support, test, manufacturing, and disposal. SE considers both the
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business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a
quality product that meets the user needs (INCOSE, 2004).
When considering common themes of systems engineering from the handbook and other
works, it is clear that asset management and systems engineering share many of the same
core concepts. For example, a life-cycle approach taking a holistic view is central to both
SE and AM. Recognition that stakeholders determine value of the outputs of the system
is another shared theme between the two fields. Optimal design, operation, and
management of a system through informed decision-making are also goals shared by both
fields.
A.4 The Need for a Systems Perspective
Many researchers and practitioners contend that traditional infrastructure
management approaches are no longer effective. Godau (1999, 2004) makes this claim
due to complexities from technology and other external factors such as economics,
politics, and the environment. Robinson, Woodard, and Varnado (1998) echo the need
for change as infrastructure systems are now more interconnected than ever. The
American Society of Civil Engineers, through in-depth roundtable discussions, found that
a common thought among discussion participants was the need to take a systems
approach towards the nation’s infrastructure (Powell, 2010). The underlying premise
held by these researchers and practitioners is that a systems orientation will help solve
problems encountered in the management of infrastructure.
Indeed, some within the SE field feel that the profession can serve as a framework
for engaging in this problem. Cook and Ferris (2007) write that SE, as a multimethodology, is an appropriate way to solve traditionally non-SE problems provided that
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the solution will be technical in nature. INCOSE itself has developed an Infrastructure
Systems Working Group (ISEWG) whose membership is concerned with the application
of the discipline of SE to physical infrastructure. The ISEWG published a special
infrastructure issue with its editor stating (Jackson, 2004):
“individual infrastructures, as well as the collective infrastructure, obey all the
rules of systems. They are all collections of assets, the subsystems, which
individually and collectively perform functions ... they can be considered a system
of systems (SoS) since they interact with each other.”
The special issue goes on to highlight the SE applications to infrastructure such as rails
(Williams et al., 2004), highways (Krueger, 2004), water (Doukas, 2004), and energy
(Bauknight, 2004). All contributing authors to this issue conclude that SE undoubtedly
has applications to infrastructure asset management.
The application of SE provides benefits to the field of asset management. One
such benefit is the understanding of system interfaces as the definition and management
of these interfaces is central to SE – it is the interactions of the parts that produce the
results desired out of the system (Maier & Rechtin, 2002). At the design stage, a systems
approach will generate a greater understanding of not just the desired end-product, but
also the problem at hand potentially leading to a superior system. Finally, during
operations and maintenance, infrastructure managers taking a systems view and holistic
decision-making approach might see reduced failures, reduced system risk, optimized
functionality, and optimized maintenance cost – which are benefits addressed in the
papers reviewed for this study.
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A.5 Comparative Analysis of SE Processes and Asset Management Practices
As previously stated, not all SE tools, techniques, and procedures are directly
applicable to the field of asset management. In fact, Godau (2004) suggests that SE
should be tailored to match infrastructure specific problems. With this in mind, of the 25
systems engineering processes and life-cycle stages specified by ISO 15288:2008, we
highlight six of these processes and demonstrate their applicability to the needs of
infrastructure managers. The remainder of the paper relates these six SE processes to
asset management practices and research found in the literature. As a starting point, the
International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM) (Roberts et al., 2006) is
referenced against the process descriptions outlined in the INCOSE Handbook (v3.2)
(Haskins, 2010). Practices and applications in the literature are used to illustrate the SE
process concepts in use. Figure A1 illustrates the direct comparisons of the SE processes
to be investigated to broad processes of asset management.

Systems Engineering
Stakeholder Requirements Definition
Process
Decision Management Process
Risk Management Process

Infrastructure Asset Management
Levels of Service
Optimized Decision-making
Risk Assessment and Management
Information Systems and Data
Management
Measure Levels of Service
Life Cycle Asset Management

Information Management Process
Measurement Process
Life Cycle Management Process

Figure A1. Comparison of six SE processes to six AM processes.
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A.5.1 Stakeholder Requirements Definition Process.
The first steps in establishing asset management processes are similar to the first
steps in systems engineering. In SE, the initial phase of any given product is to determine
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stakeholder requirements which, in turn, drive system development. For asset managers,
given that infrastructure systems are already in place, and once asset inventories have
been established, their objective in defining stakeholder requirements centers on
establishing levels of service (Roberts et al., 2006). This process involves segmenting the
customer base into identifiable groups and then understanding what these customers
value. This is necessary because, just as in SE, the differing values, agendas, needs, and
interests of the various stakeholders are used to judge the efficacy of the organization.
For SE, organizational efficacy is measured against the final product delivered; for AM,
this is judged by the level of service provided.
The question of how to determine the appropriate level of service is a topic
addressed by a number of researchers. Rogers and Louis (2008) and Ramesh and
Narayanasamy (2008) explore this question with regards to water service. The former
studied community water systems in the U.S. and the latter rural water delivery in India.
Both found that system inefficiencies resulted from decision-makers failing to properly
account for stakeholder requirements. Specifically, Rogers and Louis contend that
typical decision approaches lead to short-term positive impacts for the immediate
community (i.e., increased economic activity through capital improvements) but
potentially result in negative long-term impacts (i.e., system deterioration because of
deferred maintenance). Ramesh and Naraynasamy find that in failing to recognize the
lack of technical capability for municipalities in operating and maintaining water
infrastructure, the Indian government has provided excessive infrastructure which has
resulted in excessive water waste across the country. Rogers and Louis offer that a
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systems analyses approach could help in bringing appropriate levels of service from
community water systems.
Work in the transportation sector concerning levels of service also begins with
assessing stakeholder requirements. Yin, Lawphongpanich, and Lou (2008) provide an
approach that estimates the necessary investment for maintenance and repair of highway
networks to maintain or increase levels of service. Their mathematical model accounts
for user preferences when deciding routes and factors in unknowns such as travel demand
and asset deterioration. They report that their model presents solutions that provide
equivalent levels of service as compared to conservative investment plans but at a much
lower investment cost. Similarly, Yang, Bell, and Meng (2000) present a model that
determines appropriate road capacity and levels of service by also accounting for route
choice behavior of travelers.
A.5.2 Decision Management Process.
Another key process for AM and SE practitioners is the decision management
process. The definitions in the two fields are similar in that the process involves selecting
the optimal decision among a number of alternatives. Other similarities in this process
include utilization of classical decision-making approaches, namely risk-based and multicriteria decision-making, and the use and development of decision-making models.
Both fields recognize that there are two broad types of decision-making
approaches: risk-based decision-making and multi-criteria decision-making (Blanchard
& Fabrycky, 2011; Roberts et al., 2006). The risk-based approach quantifies the
alternatives and, combined with the likelihood of an outcome, leads to the basis of a
decision. Even though the IIMM emphasizes cost as the primary means for quantifying
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alternatives, other asset management studies use different methods for quantification.
For example, Seyedshohadaie, Damnjanovic, and Butenko (2010) use the idea of risk as a
basis for maintenance approaches on transportation infrastructure. Asset management
has wide-ranging stakeholders with varied agendas and so intangible impacts are
significant to asset managers. The multi-criteria decision method seems to be able to
address intangible impacts and there are a number of works that present multi-criteria
decision methods in transportation (Iniestra & Gutiérrez, 2009; Rybarczyk & Wu, 2010),
facility management (Montmain, Sanchez, & Vinches, 2009), waste management
(Hokkanen & Salminen, 1997; Vego, Kučar-Dragičević, & Koprivanac, 2008), and
energy (Mills, Vlacic, & Lowe, 1996).
Given these decision-making approaches, decision-making models are a
necessary component to the process. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) suggest that
decision-making models and simulations are useful tools in the process as they enable the
study of the system at far less cost and with far less time compared to direct observation
of the system. The use of decision models are widely used in asset management. Fenner
(2000) reviews decision methodologies in the water/wastewater sector and finds that
current models lead to maintenance activities only on the highest risk or most critical
sewers. He suggests a change in established decision methods is needed so that
maintenance activities are carried out that affect the wider catchment system. He also
reviews promising developments in his field such as non-critical sewer assessment, sewer
survival models, usage of performance indicators, risk analysis through sediment buildup, and rehabilitation cost analysis, but finds that a lack of data prevents meaningful
analysis of options by municipalities. Similarly, Hoskins et al. (1999) suggests that
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changes to electricity industry decision models are necessary and presents a decision
approach that recognizes the constraints of limited budgets. Claiming to be generalizable
to other infrastructures, their six-step approach is contingent on the ability of managers to
quantify and model the condition of a component, relate the component to the overall
system, and then model the component’s deterioration over time. This approach
promises to lead asset managers to more informed decisions; however, much like Fenner
(2000), Hoskins et al. finds that the availability of data limits the quality of decisions.
A.5.3 Risk Management Process.
There is considerable overlap in how asset management and systems engineering
treat risk management. Both the SE Handbook and IIMM provide similar outlines for the
risk management process with key steps including setting the risk context, identifying the
candidate risk, analyzing each risk, developing risk treatment strategies, and continuous
monitoring and review of the risk management process (Haskins, 2010; Roberts et al.,
2006). Additionally, both sources define risk in the same manner and that risk is
composed of the likelihood an event will happen and the consequence of that event
happening. Finally, both advocate the use of risk rating tables to visually depict the
magnitude of a given risk.
Although the considerable overlap suggests that risk management is a welldeveloped concept in SE and AM, several studies offer insights that may allow even
greater incorporation of risk management into the asset management process. For
example, Piyatrapooni, Kumar, and Setunge (2004) suggests the use of risk maps that
synthesize individual risks onto a single graph and categorize each risk event into one of
three “tolerability regions.” Risk mapping could then be incorporated into the decision-
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making process to lead to more confident decisions by asset managers. Austin and
Samadzaeh (2008) propose a novel metric for systems engineers to measure the
effectiveness of a risk management system. They found that a large body of literature
exists which evaluate different risk management systems, but found that the literature did
not offer a “risk management effectiveness” metric. They propose a measure of
effectiveness metric with the aim to contribute to the improvement of the overall SE risk
management system. This metric is fully applicable to asset management systems.
Specific applications of risk management principles in differing sectors of infrastructure
include applications in facility management (Taillandier, Sauce, & Bonetto, 2009), water
infrastructure (Pollard, Strutt, Macgillivray, Hamilton, & Hrudey, 2004; Rogers & Louis,
2008), transportation (Mansouri, Nilchiani, & Mostashari, 2010; Seyedshohadaie et al.,
2010), and energy (Bertolini, Bevilacqua, Ciarapica, & Giacchetta, 2009; Nordgård &
Sand, 2010).
A.5.4 Information Management.
The SE information management process is the overall process that ensures
relevant information is collected, available in a timely manner, valid and complete, and
accessible through an archived database of information (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011).
Asset managers recognize the need for information management systems (Halfawy,
2010; Rasdorf et al., 2009; Sitzabee, Rasdorf, Hummer, & Devine, 2009; U.S. DOT,
1999). The IIMM provides characteristics of good asset management systems which
include proper information architecture, ease of upgrades and expansion, ability to
integrate data across platforms, adequacy of information technology support, and
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sufficient resources provided by the organization to support the information management
system (Roberts et al., 2006).
Examples of information systems used by asset managers are geographic
information systems (GIS) which relate geospatial data to specific components of an
infrastructure system, maintenance management systems (MMS) which store and manage
information regarding an organization’s maintenance activities, and pavement
management systems (PMS) and bridge management systems (BMS) which are used
extensively in the management of U.S. roads and bridges. These and other tools like
them enable the collection and analysis of asset data and are central to effective asset
management processes (U.S. DOT, 1999). In addition to data collection and analysis,
other key components of these systems include feedback and update mechanisms,
analytical models, and built-in processes which identify and recommend capital
improvement, maintenance, and repair investment strategies. The use of information
management systems has been proven to increase management effectiveness (Burns,
Hope, & Roorda, 1999; U.S. DOT, 1999); however, the increasingly complex,
interdependent nature, and data availability on today’s infrastructure systems present a
data management problem in the form of data integration for asset managers.
Much like SE, information system data integration is of importance to asset
managers because poor integration results in organizational inefficiencies and suboptimal
decision-making (Halfawy, 2010; Rasdorf et al., 2009). Problems of current information
processes include: (1) data storage within “silos” resulting in duplication and
inconsistencies, (2) data errors resulting from translation and re-entry into different
systems, (3) data source fragmentation which creates difficulties in generating
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comprehensive views, and (4) an overall, highly inefficient information management
system (Halfawy, 2010; Rasdorf et al., 2009). Data integration is not a new field of study
in AM as the past two decades include works addressing this problem (Halfawy, 2010;
Shen et al., 2010). However, these works report that asset managers are behind other
fields in addressing this problem due to organizational fragmentation across industry and
government. Organizational fragmentation leads to data fragmentation and presents a
serious challenge in data integration. Given information’s central role in asset
management, it is imperative that data integration be taken into account when developing
AM information systems.
A.5.5 Measurement Process.
Tied to the information management process is the measurement process. The
measurement process as defined by INCOSE is the collection, analysis, and reporting of
data on product performance and organizational processes which support management
decision-making and contribute towards performance improvement of the system
(Haskins, 2010). Similarly, asset managers collect performance measures for the
comparison of system performance to levels of service. The IIMM categorizes these
measures into two types: asset condition states and system performance (Roberts et al.,
2006). Two particular concerns are the ability for asset managers to provide accurate
measures of condition states and the ability to determine future performance of
infrastructure systems.
Asset condition states and system performance do not necessarily have direct
relationships with each other (Roberts et al., 2006). A degraded asset may or may not
lead to degraded system performance and degraded system performance is not
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necessarily indicative of degraded assets. For example, water pipes with severe corrosion
could still function properly in transporting water. Alternatively, a poorly functioning
electrical grid does not necessarily point to inefficiencies from degraded substations,
electrical lines, transformers, or other assets. Such cases could be caused from operator
error or severe weather. However, a failed condition state of an asset would undoubtedly
lead to performance failure. So although the metric of interest is system performance,
asset condition states must also be measured to prevent system performance failure. Of
interest in the literature is the use of remote sensors for structural health monitoring of
civil structures such as bridges and buildings (Chang, Flatau, & Liu, 2003; J. P. Lynch,
2004; J. Lynch, 2007). These researchers explore recent developments in the design and
use of sensor technology given its low cost and accessibility as compared to currently
practiced and labor-intensive visual inspections. In general, they find that the technology
has proven valuable in detecting substantial damage caused by a single, disruptive event,
but further work is needed to develop sensing methods for early stages of damage caused
by gradual deterioration.
Condition states by themselves are only useful to asset managers in providing the
current condition at a given point in time. More useful to asset management is the ability
to predict component performance, which would lead to system performance forecasts.
Therefore, this component modeling is of particular interest, specifically mathematical
models which provide a means of predictive assessment for a particular asset (AbuElanien & Salama, 2010; Ching & Leu, 2009; Sitzabee et al., 2009). Because of the great
variety of asset types, techniques for condition asset measurement vary greatly. For
example, Sitzabee, Rasdorf, Hummer, and Devine (2009) document the process of
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gathering data for low-value/high-volume assets (road markings) through visual
inspection and random sampling. Abu-Elanien and Salama (2010), on the other hand,
gather data for transformers (high-value/low volume assets) and do so through inspection
of each individual asset and with techniques beyond visual inspection. Mathematical
deterioration models are applied using condition assessments and other factors and the
results of such models are considered by asset managers as they construct their respective
maintenance plans or make key decisions in maintenance and repair activity.
A.5.6 Life-Cycle Model Management.
Finally, the issue of life-cycle model management for asset managers is
addressed. As defined in the INCOSE Handbook, life-cycle model management is an
organizational process that creates life-cycle models as a basis for common reference to a
project’s life-cycle (Haskins, 2010). Additionally, feedback mechanisms from this
process are generated for systems engineers to determine if the organization is following
its own management process and adjustments are made accordingly. The IIMM
considers life-cycle models similarly but focuses more on the operations and
maintenances phases of the system life-cycle (Roberts et al., 2006).
As such, two views, a global systems view or component level view, can be taken
of asset life-cycle. First, a global system view can be taken of the entire system usually
to understand overall system life-cycle costs (LCC) or life-cycle value (LCV). A review
of published case studies shows successful implementation of LCC in the facility
construction, energy, and transportation sectors (Korpi, 2008). Kim et al. (2010)
demonstrate its applicability by developing an LCC estimate for light rail transit. The
objective for conducting these analyses is to achieve the lowest long-term costs in system
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operation and maintenance rather than choosing alternatives that result in short-term
savings (Roberts et al., 2006). Unfortunately, policy makers typically gravitate towards
the latter approach which results in increased future risk due to deferred maintenance and
repairs. Slightly different from LCC is the idea of measuring and quantifying value in
LCV which places emphasis on stakeholder requirements, both present and future. Some
argue that analyses of LCV lead to better designed systems since perceived value changes
with stakeholders over time (Browning & Honour, 2008). Developing a system that can
endure these changes will lead to a more valuable system and they illustrate their case
with the development of the U.S. cellular infrastructure.
An alternative view of life-cycle can be taken at the component level of a system
for the purpose of analyzing component performance. Abu-Elanien and Salama (2010)
apply asset management modeling techniques on electrical transformers in order to
determine performance degradation over time. Their approach is mimicked for other
electrical distribution assets as demonstrated by Hoskins et al. (1999) for oil-filled circuit
breakers. The implications from these component models are applicable to the greater
energy distribution system since these are critical components to the larger systems.
Component life-cycle analyses such as these are necessary inputs used in various asset
management decision processes and contribute data to system life-cycle costs, as already
discussed.
Finally, the SE Handbook specifies that life-cycle model management should
include a feedback mechanism for regular review of its processes. Asset management
holds this component of life-cycle management in much the same way. Without doing
so, asset management organizations risk misalignment of its management processes with
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strategic objectives, legal and regulatory requirements, and customer expectations
(Roberts et al., 2006; U.S. DOT, 1999)
A.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a comparative analysis of systems engineering and asset
management practices found in the literature from the past 10 years. Researchers in the
field of systems engineering and asset management assert that SE processes can be
applied to asset management and this paper explores that claim. Six processes described
in the SE INCOSE Handbook are elaborated. Specifically, the processes of stakeholder
requirements definition, decision management, risk management, information
management, measurement, and life-cycle model management are viewed as having
direct applicability to the AM field and examples of their application are illustrated by
various works in the asset management and systems engineering literature. In fact, the
need for a systems approach to infrastructure asset management has been highlighted by
practitioners in the field. Systems engineering researchers have found that SE practices
are applicable to areas outside their expertise and the increasingly complex and
interconnected nature of infrastructure systems make it suitable for application of the SE
discipline. However, application of systems methods, processes, and techniques is found
to be limited and the techniques vary according to infrastructure sector. Nevertheless,
continued crossover of SE processes and techniques into the field of asset management
hold promise for greater effectiveness in the management of infrastructure systems.
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Appendix B. Literature Review on Simulation and Modeling Methods in
Critical Infrastructure Protection

This appendix provides an overview of the modeling and simulation methods
found in the infrastructure protection literature. The work presented here provided a
starting point in the modeling of infrastructure systems by narrowing the choices of
possible methods to a small group of four. These four groups of modeling methods are
presented through a discussion of various work found in the literature.
B.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures are systems and assets so vital to the United States that
their disruption will lead to severe consequences for the country’s national security,
economy, or public health and safety (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
Critical infrastructures are highly interconnected systems and in which the inherent
relationships represent a new and rapidly growing area of study (Satumtira & DueñasOsorio, 2010). Authors have characterized the different types of infrastructure
interdependencies (Haimes et al., 2007; Rinaldi et al., 2001) and others have researched
ways to model and simulate infrastructure behavior as a result of these interdependencies
(Bagheri & Ghorbani, 2008; Brown, 2007; Pederson et al., 2006). This work provides a
general taxonomy of the most prevalent critical infrastructure simulation and modeling
techniques. First, a background into network interdependencies of critical infrastructure
systems is offered and then four interdependency modeling classes are proposed and
explained.
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B.2 Background
Infrastructure systems provide essential goods and services to people and, as such,
are the basic underpinnings of modern society. These systems are typically ignored and
taken for granted until there is some sort of system failure (Roberts et al., 2006) which
results in a loss or degradation of service. The work of protecting these systems is
important to the continuous functioning of society and professional organizations and
governments are attempting to call to light the importance of infrastructure. For
example, the American Society of Civil Engineers has been publicly acknowledging the
degraded state of the U.S. infrastructure system (Powell, 2010) and the U.S. government
has been working since the early 1990s on protecting these infrastructures at the national
level (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1996).
The events of 9/11 spurred interest and focus on critical infrastructure protection.
The Department of Homeland Security was formed shortly after 9/11 and was charged
with developing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP provides
the framework for coordinating national efforts to protect infrastructure from damage or
destruction through deliberate efforts (such as a terrorist attack), natural disaster, or some
sort of other emergency (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). As with all
broad and far-reaching objectives, the efforts in meeting this goal vary greatly and one
such area of work is in the simulation and modeling of these infrastructure systems.
Infrastructure systems are highly interconnected systems within themselves
(components are networked together to function as a single system) and to other systems
(outputs from one system are inputs to another). These interconnections, whether internal
or external, create system behaviors that can be predicted if modeled or simulated
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correctly. The results from predicting infrastructure behavior after a disruptive event can
result in policies and initiatives which better protect these systems. Because individual
infrastructures are not stand-alone entities and require other infrastructures to function,
the idea of infrastructure interdependency, and the risks resulting from these
interdependencies, is an actively researched and growing field (Satumtira & DueñasOsorio, 2010).
In their seminal work, Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) provide basic
definitions to facilitate the discussion of infrastructure interdependencies. First, they
establish the difference between the terms dependency and interdependency. An
infrastructure dependency is a relationship between two infrastructures which is unidirectional. That is, one infrastructure relies on the output of a different infrastructure (or
multiple infrastructures) and this relationship is not reciprocal. An infrastructure
interdependency is a bi-directional relationship between two or more infrastructures
where the infrastructure outputs are mutually relied upon by the infrastructure systems
involved. In other words, an interdependency exists when systems are dependent on each
other. Conceptually simple, the notion of interdependency increases the complexity of a
system, and this complexity creates behaviors within the “system of systems” that are not
intuitively predictable. These complexities and behaviors are the interest of researchers
studying the field of infrastructure interdependencies.
Rinaldi et al. (2001) go on to formulate a six-dimension framework of
infrastructure interdependencies important to the field of infrastructure protection
research, but this paper will provide a brief overview of just one dimension –
interdependency types. Haimes et al. (2007), McNally et al. (2007), and Johansson and
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Hassel (2010) provide similar classification schemes and the differences within the
lexicon are indicative of a still growing field. Figure B1 shows these three classifications
graphically. Rinaldi et al. (2001) establishes that four types of interdependencies exist:
physical, cyber, geographic, and logical. Physical interdependencies are relationships
based on material outputs from one infrastructure being passed to another as a material
input. Cyber interdependencies exist when information is the entity being passed
between infrastructures. Geographical interdependencies are based on physical
proximity, e.g., infrastructures are located such that a localized event affects the status of
these infrastructures. Finally, logical interdependencies exist when there is a bidirectional relationship and this relationship is neither physical, cyber, nor geographical.
(For an example, see Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) explanation on California’s
electricity/financial market logical interdependency.)
A variation of Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) work incorporates economic
interdependencies. Haimes et al. (2007) also describes four interdependency types of
physical, logical, information, and economic couplings. Physical, logical, and
information couplings are similar to the above definitions of physical, logical, and cyber
interdependencies; economic couplings are introduced. (In his work, Haimes uses the
term “couplings” rather than interdependency, a sign that the study of infrastructure
protection is still a new field). Economic couplings attempt to predict the economic
behavior of either a region or economic sectors as a result of interdependencies and
economic inputs and outputs. Regional economic couplings are similar to geographic
interdependencies by spatially bounding the economy of interest. Inter-sector economic
couplings address the linkages of entire economic sectors without the limits of
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geography. This input-output view of infrastructure interdependency is useful in
predicting post-disaster effects on economies of interest and is the basis of a major
modeling and simulation technique in infrastructure interdependency, discussed later in
this appendix.
Finally, McNally et al. (2007) and Johansson and Hassel (2010) offer a simpler
framework for infrastructure interdependency. In attempting to synthesize geographic
interdependencies with Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) three other types, these works propose that
interdependency classifications be even more generally classified into two broad
categories: functional and spatial. They propose functional interdependencies to
encompass Rinaldi et al.’s (2001) three classes of physical, cyber, and logical
interdependencies while spatial interdependencies receive the same treatment as
geographical interdependencies.

Figure B1. Graphical comparison of three interdependency classification schemes.
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The interdependency types are important to understand as these contribute to
differences in relationships within and across infrastructures. For example, when dealing
with time scales, transactions based on cyber and logical interdependencies occur in very
short cycles compared to physical transactions. As another example, spatial and
functional interdependencies differ from each other as spatial interdependencies are static
(infrastructures typically do not move) whereas functional interdependencies are
dynamic. Understanding the differences between the interdependency types is necessary
in building accurate and realistic models and simulations. Four different classes of
modeling and simulation methods are briefly described in the next section.
B.3 Simulation and Modeling Classifications
Within the field of critical infrastructure interdependency simulation and
modeling, researchers have proposed many different tools and methods in order to better
understand infrastructure behaviors and plan for their protection. Several works have
synthesized the literature by listing specific tools and methods. Specifically, the works
by Cummings et al. (2006), Pederson et al. (2006), and Bagheri & Ghorbani (2008)
provide insight to the current state of the literature by providing lists of the “state of the
art” in critical infrastructure modeling and simulation. Although these works are
comprehensive in nature, greater abstraction of critical infrastructure modeling and
simulation into broad categories is necessary to provide a basic understanding of the state
of the field. A taxonomy of critical infrastructure simulation and modeling techniques
will help in identifying theoretically similar tools and methods, while at the same time
providing a means for identifying new tools and methods. In the most detailed and
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comprehensive work covering the literature, Satumtira and Duenas-Osorio (2010) present
a study that suggests the taxonomy consist of four classes.
B.3.1 Input-output inoperability Model (IIM).
Based on economist Leontief’s work of economic interdependencies, the Inputoutput inoperability Model (IIM) simulates the inter- and intra-connectedness of
infrastructure systems by modeling the “risk of inoperability” of a system as an input or
output to other systems. The risk of inoperability is an expected value based on the
likelihood (probability) of inoperability. Inoperability is expressed as a value between 0
and 1, where zero denotes no inoperability (flawless operation) and 1 denotes complete
inoperability (complete failure). A matrix is developed which correlates these
inoperability expected values to interconnected systems; through matrix algebra, the
inoperability of the entire system (or subsystem) can be simulated when a disturbance is
introduced.
The benefit of this simulation method is threefold. First, since the IIM is a
mathematical model, no specialized modeling software, and associated costs and time for
training, is needed. The basic matrix algebra can easily be completed on standard
spreadsheet applications. Second, mathematics leads to quantifiable effects of disruption
through the system under study and this quantification leads to better investment
strategies for infrastructure protection (Crowther & Haimes, 2005). Through the IIM,
decision-makers will have an objective means for comparing one protection strategy over
another. Finally, the IIM can be scaled to different levels of interest. The method can be
scaled up to explore macro-economic effects or scaled down to a local or plant level to
discover disruption cascades at these lower levels.
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The level of detail necessary in developing an IIM simulation is its primary
limitation. To accurately predict a system’s interdependent behavior, the inoperability
values that are transmitted between infrastructures must be determined. Unlike the
macro-economic level, which may use data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
lower levels of simulation require extensive data collection to determine appropriate
values. A second limitation with the IIM method is its applicability in analyzing events
immediately after a disruptive event. Crowther and Haimes (2005) report that this model
is most appropriate for systems operating in equilibrium since a chief assumption is an
inherent stability of interdependency between systems. Results of an introduced
perturbation should then only be interpreted as a new equilibrium for these systems.
In response to these limitations, two extensions and adaptations have been
developed. Dynamic IIM (DIIM) and the Multi-Regional IIM (MR-IIM) attempt to
address the temporal and geographical aspects of a disaster (Haimes et al., 2007). The
DIIM has the ability to describe effects of recovery immediately after a disaster. It also
incorporates the concept of system resilience, a concept lacking in the IIM. MR-IIM has
the ability to model impacts across multiple regions through the use of geospatial
databases. Further exploration of these two models is worth additional study as their
development could lead to better decision-making tools for infrastructure policy-makers.
B.3.2 Agent-Based Modeling (ABM).
Agent-based modeling is a new approach in modeling complex systems and is
applicable in a wide variety of fields (Bonabeau, 2002; MacAl & North, 2010). This
theoretical framework is based on the idea that a system is composed of individual agents
acting independently and that these actions result in an emergent behavior of the overall
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system. Researchers have demonstrated that ABM is an appropriate tool for simulating
infrastructure interdependency behavior (Amin, 2000, 2001; Brown, 2007; Cardellini,
Casalicchio, & Galli, 2007; Panzieri, Setola, & Ulivi, 2004).
Macal and North (2010) outline the three essential elements for a typical agentbased model. First, there must be a set of agents that are described with attributes and
behaviors through specific algorithms. Infrastructure decision-makers and control
mechanisms would be these agents. Second, there must be relationships between agents.
Given the networked nature of infrastructure interdependency, these relationships are
innate with the problem under study. Third, the environmental setting must be identified
as agents which also interact with their environment. For example, infrastructure policies
at differing governmental levels could be modeled as discrete agents.
When complete, an ABM may provide counter-intuitive system behaviors or
illustrate new system equilibriums. Bonabeau (2002) outlines that the ability to capture
emergent system phenomena is one of the three ABM benefits. The other two are a
“natural description” of the system and ABM’s flexibility in modeling across different
system dimensions. Natural description refers to the “bottom-up” technique of describing
the system. The modeler looks at the system from its discrete components at the lowest
levels (rather than at a high level of abstraction) and formulates the agent behavior from
the agent’s point of view. This frame of reference results in a simulation that captures
what an agent actually does and, thus, is more natural. The flexibility in ABM is realized
when there is a need to scale up or down the simulation. For example, the number of
agents can easily be increased or decreased, the level of system abstraction (e.g.,
modeling granularity) can also be increased or decreased, or the details of the agents
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themselves can be more detailed or generalized. This flexibility is helpful when certain
system details are not known, which can be the case for large scale systems, and
modifications to the model are necessary for its usefulness.
B.3.3 Network (Graph Theory) Methods.
Equally new in the field of infrastructure interdependency is the application of
network analysis, known as graph theory in mathematics, to infrastructure
interdependency simulation and modeling (Satumtira & Dueñas-Osorio, 2010). This
branch of mathematics uses nodes and edges to define relationships (edges) between
objects (nodes). Much like in ABM, the interconnected nature of infrastructures naturally
lends itself to this type of analysis. Nodes represent discrete units within and across
infrastructures that consume or produce resources, and edges represent the path that these
resources take to and from nodes. The representation of these interconnections form the
system’s topology and with this structure, graph theory modelers attempt to capture
system performance and risks. Indeed, Duenas-Osorio, Craig, and Goodno (2004)
highlight that one of the major objectives of graph theory in infrastructure research is the
ability to predict a system’s behavior based only on topology, disruptions introduced, and
the rule sets that govern nodes and edges.
Osorio, Craig, and Goodno (2004) also provide a brief discussion on the pertinent
properties of network topologies and variations of network models within graph theory.
With regards to network topologies, topological properties provide modelers insight into
the degrees of connectedness of an infrastructure. These elements can describe the
global, local, and even randomness of connections within the system. By understanding
these statistical properties, comparisons may be made between model variations or real-
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world networks for better understanding or more realistic modeling. Regarding network
models, Osorio, Craig, and Goodno (2004) and Lewis (2006) highlight different graph
theory modeling types as applied to infrastructure interdependency. The emergence of
applying graph theory to infrastructure research is evident and both works indicate a
further need for research which addresses the validity of graph theory in this application.
However, the literature is not without examples of such work. Applications of graph
theory models addressing interdependency include natural gas and power generation
(Nozick et al., 2004) and water and power distribution (Dueñas-Osorio, Craig, &
Goodno, 2007; Dueñas-Osorio, Craig, Goodno, & Bostrom, 2007).
B.3.4 Other Modeling Types.
This final category attempts to capture the simulation and modeling types that do
not fit in the three above major categories, but have some presence in the literature worth
mentioning. Systems dynamics and social network analysis have been used to analyze
interdependency vulnerability but have yet to gain traction as major modeling and
simulation types within the field. What follows is a brief explanation of the two methods.
Systems Dynamics. Systems dynamics is a simulation approach that attempts to
create a better understanding of complex systems by modeling the interconnections of
elements through feedback loops and stocks and flows of resources. This method often
leads to counter-intuitive, non-linear results of system behavior. Work at the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center highlight several infrastructure simulations
based on this method (Brown, Beyeler, & Barton, 2004; Brown, 2007). These models are
able to show system limitations based on system storage capacities, broad policy effects
on systems under study, and supply and demand effects.
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The ability to show these types of results are somewhat different than the other
major simulation modeling types. Systems dynamics offers a more temporal perspective
of system vulnerability, whereas IIM, ABM, and network graph theory work with a more
static view of the system. The holistic and dynamic modeling process central to systems
dynamics offer key insights into the system under study. The necessary system
aggregation to do this, however, is a limitation to this modeling type. Modeling analysts
must be able to take a high-level perspective of the system in question; therefore, lower
level details may be ignored or assumed. The process of creating these assumptions must
be carefully done; otherwise, the results of the model may be rejected by the intended
audience.
Social Network Analysis. Social network analysis is a method of analysis that
examines the relationships of entities of a network and reveals patterns and implications
within the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Chai et al. (2008) used this method to
show the relative importance of specific infrastructures suggesting that policy could be
shaped to protect the top-most systems. Brown (2007) simulated the impacts of an
influenza pandemic and used social network analysis to suggest policy to better protect a
community. This type of analysis is predominantly applied in social science research, but
the interconnections of infrastructure systems allow for this type of analysis. Although
there is evidence of its applicability, the critical infrastructure protection studies using
social network analysis have yet to gain traction within the literature.
B.4 Conclusion
This work presented the results of a literature review into critical infrastructure
modeling and simulation. A taxonomy of four broad techniques was created: input-
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output inoperability modeling, agent-based modeling, network (graph theory), and other.
This taxonomy is useful in understanding the state of the literature on the modeling and
simulation techniques of critical infrastructures. The area of critical infrastructure
protection remains a growing field and the characterization of the current modeling and
simulation methods brings some clarity to this area of research.
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Appendix C. Procedure Logs and Notes on Topological Cleaning for Geographic
Information System Data

This appendix contains an excerpt of procedure logs and notes taken during the
data analysis portion of the research. A geographic information system (GIS) procedure
log is a document which outlines the actions a GIS operator has taken in processing the
workflow for a particular project. A procedure log is helpful in that it provides a guide
for future reference to other GIS operators so that analysis and cartographic products can
be replicated. Due to the size of the existing log, this appendix does not provide the
complete record for the GIS processes implemented in this dissertation. Instead, it
provides the portions of the log, as well as the research notes, which directly relate to the
topological cleaning necessary to make the data usable. Data topology was discovered
to be an issue in that the lack of, or inconsistencies in, topological connections prevented
any analysis from being conducted. Therefore, extensive data preparation was necessary
for the data used in this research. This chapter is divided into seven sections constituting
six separate entries in the log and a conclusion summarizing this appendix.
C.1 Initial Work with the GIS Dataset
(10 June 2013) On set-up of the initial ArcMap document, import data from the
source .mdb file. Figure C1 provides the feature datasets and accompanying feature
classes that were imported.
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base_data
Description: Contains the installation
boundary, facilities, parking and roads
Feature classes:
structure_exisiting_area, road_area,
vehicle_driveway_area,
vehicle_parking_area,
installation_area

utilities_gas
Description: Information on the
natural gas distribution system
Feature classes:
nat_gas_reg_reducer_point,
natural_gas_meter_point,
natural_gas_tank_point,
natural_gas_line

utilities_fuel
Description: POL fuel distribution
system
Feature classes: fuel_anode_point,
fuel_farm_point, fuel_hydrant_point,
fuel_junction_point, fuel_pump_point,
fuel_regulator_reducer_point,
fuel_source_point, fuel_tank_point,
fuel_valve_point, fuel_line,
fuel_farm_area, fuel_junction_area,
fuel_tank_area

utilities_hcs
Description: heating and cooling
system (small number of buildings)
Feature classes:
heat_cool_junction_point,
heat_cool_pump_point,
heat_cool_valve_point,
heat_cool_line,
heat_cool_junction_area, heate_cool,
plant_area

utilities_water
Description: water distribution
system; includes both hydrant water
and potable water
Feature classes:
drinking_water_sample_point,
water_anode_test_station_point,
water_fire_connection_point,
water_fitting_point,
water_hydrant_point,
water_meter_point,
water_pump_point,
water_pump_station_point,
water_rectifier_point,
water_regulator_reducer_point,
water_tank_point, water_valve_point,
water_line, water_pump_station_area,
water_tank_area

utilities_electric
Description: electric distribution
system
Feature classes:
elect_transformer_bank_point,
electrical_capacitor_point,
electrical_junction_point,
electrical_meter_point,
electrical_riser_point,
electrical_switch_point,
exterior_lighting_point,
electrical_cable_line,
electrical_junction_area

Figure C1. Imported feature datasets and classes.22

For each dataset, conduct a first round of “cleaning”:
Step 1. Remove “abandoned” and other lines not in use.
Step 2. Make topological connections.
Step 3. Determine building adjacencies.
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In this initial run with infrastructure data, a better understanding of a polyline
emerges. The polyline data structure within ArcGIS allows for a group of line segments
to be stored as a single feature. In other words, a polyline represents multiple line
segments as a single line. An interesting question is raised: what if it were possible to
model each polyline with similar attributes as a single node with facilities attached to this
polyline as adjacencies? Some fidelity in the modeling process would be lost (i.e., a
“chunk” of the network would be modeled as a single node), but in areas where a lot of
congestion exists, this modeling method might increase performance of the model. This
method might also be helpful as the polyline may have a unique “date acquired” attribute
associated with it and this attribute would help in modeling the facility decay for that
segment of lines.
C.2 Refinement of the Import and Topological Cleaning Procedures
(11 June 2013) This section presents a more detailed and refined procedure for
importing and further topological cleaning of the data. There are four major steps in the
process:
Step 1. Import the facilities feature class and the infrastructure feature class of interest.
These two feature classes are the basis of the data for the simulation.
Step 2. Isolate the infrastructure lines and delete the unwanted lines. For the heating and
cooling infrastructure, delete any line labeled as a “return line” and any line
labeled as “abandoned”. The interest is solely in whether or not a facility is
connected to the infrastructure and return lines and abandoned lines provide
unnecessary information.
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Step 3. Ensure the topology of the network is established. There are three things to
check:
Step 3(a). Ensure that lines are co-incident. Co-incidence is where the snapping
functionality of ArcGIS’s editing environment is helpful. Any lines that
are not co-incident must be edited to be so.
Step 3(b). Ensure that lines are drawn such that their directionality makes
intuitive sense. Although ArcGIS has a number of tools that might be
helpful, manually adjusting the lines will be the only way to correct this
aspect of the network topology. One tool that is not immediately useful is
the “Flip Lines” tool available as a standard ArcGIS toolbox. Its utility is
limited because it changes the directionality of an entire feature class
rather than one line at a time. Another tool that is not useful is the
“Display Arrows” tool in the Flow Analysis feature of the Geometric
Networks add-in. As discovered earlier in the research, although the
geometric networks function can simulate the flow direction, the structure
of the Python code is such that the Xto, Yto, Xfrom, and Yfrom attributes of
the network polylines must be set beforehand. This leads to the
requirement to adjust these lines manually. In order to make the
adjustments manually, each vertex in the polyline must be edited in the
editing environment.
Step 3(c). Finally, ensure that each line starts and stops at building centroids. All
lines did not stop at the centroids and so the feature to point tool was used
to create these centroids. The steps to do so are below:
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Feature to Point:  Arc Toolbox  Data Management Tools 
Features Feature to Point
Step 4. Not all facilities will participate in a given infrastructure. Therefore, to reduce
computer processor workload, reduce the facility list to only the subset of
participating facilities. This requires creating a new, smaller feature class. The
steps to do so are below:
Step 4(a). Select the desired facilities.
Step 4(b) Export the selection to an output table. This is done through the
attributes table frame.
Step 4(c) In the ArcCatalog window, create a feature class from this new table
Step 4(d) Select “From XY table”
Step 4(e) Specify the X fields and the Y fields … this ensures the coordinates get
transferred over
Step 4(f) Select “OK”
After completion of the above steps, a question concerning topology versus data
accuracy can be raised. One of the problems encountered is the need to adjust and clean
the dataset in order for the coding script to work. In order to be able to mathematically
represent the network structure, topological connections must be made within the GIS
data. The “before” and “after” screenshots in Figure C2 illustrate the issue.

141

Figure C2. Before and after screenshots for topological connections.

23

Note how the line in the center of the left frame is moved in order to make the
connection to the building (right frame). If the distance of the line is an important factor,
then this adjustment might have a significant impact on the modeling results. Currently,
ensuring this topological connection (and thus being able to express it mathematically) is
more important and the reason for the adjustment.
C.3 firstPoint, lastPoint Methods and the read_shp Function
C.3.1 firstPoint, lastPoint Methods
(13 Jun 2013) The firstPoint and lastPoint methods are particularly useful tools
in extracting the first point and last point of a polyline. These points allow for the
determination of the line directionality, which is important in the building of the
directional adjacency matrix for the input-output inoperability model. Additionally,
knowing the endpoints of a polyline allows for easy scanning across the network to
determine a line start or end and determine if these points are inside of a facility polygon.
A third method, the within method, can be used for this comparison. If an endpoint is
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within a polygon, then the polygon label and the endpoint coordinates are stored in a
dictionary for labeling. The code for this functionality is below:
rows = arcpy.SearchCursor(Network_Lines)
nodes_dict = {}
for row in rows:
d = {}
line_feat = row.getValue('Shape')
firstpoint = line_feat.firstPoint
lastpoint = line_feat.lastPoint
facs = arcpy.SearchCursor(Facilities_FeatClass)
for fac in facs:
facility = fac.getValue('Shape')
firstpoint_within = firstpoint.within(facility)
lastpoint_within = lastpoint.within(facility)
if firstpoint_within == True:
d = {str(fac.STRUCTNAME + '_' +
str(fac.OBJECTID)):
tuple((firstpoint.X, firstpoint.Y))}
if lastpoint_within == True:
d = {str(fac.STRUCTNAME + '_' +
str(fac.OBJECTID)):
tuple((firstpoint.X, firstpoint.Y))}

With this code, the coordinates for the endpoints of the network that originate or
terminate within a facility can be recorded. What is left to determine are the endpoints
and the directionality of those endpoints that do not terminate within a facility.
Generically, within ArcGIS, these points are called “junctions”.
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C.3.2 The Problem with the ready_shp Funciton.
The second portion of this entry provides some thoughts on the read_shp
function. The read_shp function originally offered a promising method for determining
network topology, but it was discovered that this function has a flaw. In previous work,
NetworkX’s read_shp function was used in order to extract an adjacency list for a sample
networked system. Although these test runs led to successfully extracting an adjacency
list, the read_shp function will ultimately not meet the current research needs. There are
two primary reasons for this.
First, the read_shp function requires the underlying polyline feature class of the
relevant network be in the form of a shapefile. A shapefile is a data file format unique to
the ArcGIS platform and requires the creation of a separate file from the original data
which introduces the problem of data integrity. If edits to the underlying polyline feature
class are required (even a small spatial adjustment), the two files, the feature class and
shapefile, would no longer match and any functions extracting information from the
shapefile will extract outdated information. Thus, one problem is solved by abandoning
the read_shp function.
Second, the read_shp function only indicates an adjacency at the start and
endpoints of the polyline. Therefore, if a line originates from the middle of a second line,
ArcGIS will visually depict an intersection at that junction, but the NetworkX read_shp
function will not record an adjacency between these two lines. A possible solution to this
particular problem would be to employ the touches method. In the data preparation
phase, spatial adjustments to the utility network are necessary and these adjustments offer
the opportunity to ensure proper directionality of each polyline in the network. Using the

144

touches method (and the newly discovered firstPoint and lastPoint methods), a script
might be possibly written which could account for each junction from the polyline feature
class and ensures that the proper adjacency within the shapefile is captured. However,
this solution has not been employed to date and will require additional work to test and
implement the procedure.
C.4 Geometries and the “Within” and “Touches” Relationships
(18 June 2013) To date, code has been developed which uses a nested looping
structure to determine the network adjacencies for each node in the system. In short, the
code uses two loops that compare individual polylines of the network to each other. The
outer loop iterates through the list of network polylines and for each line, an inner loop
iterates through the same list in order to make a comparison. If two lines touch, another
comparison is made to determine the directionality of the connection.
There are five cases of relationships that are necessary to identify. These five
cases can be segregated in to two categories: within and touches. The definition of two
geometries touching requires that (1) there be an intersection between the two objects and
(2) this intersection does not involve the interior portions of both objects. Therefore,
there can be a touching relationship when two endpoints touch (touches) or when an
endpoint touches the interior of an object (within). If a touching relationship is
determined, then the nature of the relationship (one of the five cases) must be determined.
The five cases, divided among the two categories, within and touches, are shown below:
C.4.1 “Within” Relationships.
A “within” relationship exists when the endpoint of one line is coincident with an
interior point of the touching line. This category is the simplest of the two types and two
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cases are illustrated in Figure C.3. Depending on which endpoint touches the polyline
(firstPoint or lastPoint), the adjacency of line a to b (lastPoint of a is within b) or b to a
(firstPoint of a is within b) is captured and recorded.

Figure C3. Two examples of a “within” relationship. 24

C.4.2 “Touches” Relationships.
The second set of cases is slightly more complex and encompasses the remaining
three kinds of touching relationships. These cases are called “touches” because only the
endpoints of both polylines touch and the interior of either polyline is not involved in the
relationship. The three cases are illustrated in Figure C4.
The first case in Figure C4 shows the possibility of identifying source nodes. For
now, these types of relationships should be ignored and can be later identified when
facility information is introduced. The rationale behind ignoring has to do with the case
when three lines form a “T” intersection. If one line ends at the intersection and two lines
originate from it, the code as written would identify the two lines touching at their
firstPoints as a source node, when in fact, two directional adjacencies should instead be
captured.
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Figure C4. Three examples of a touches relationship. 25
The second case in Figure C4 identifies the possibility of a sink node. As with the
source nodes, these relationships should also be ignored for now. Although the current
network does not identify any sorts of these relationships, the possibility of errors being
created at “T” intersections exists and therefore, this relationship should be ignored.
Finally, there are lastPoint to firstPoint relationships that are captured and should
not be ignored. This third case is where one polyline ends where another polyline begins.
Therefore, if two lines touch, and they touch in such a way that the lastPoint of one line is
coincident with the firstPoint of another line, then there is a beginning to end relationship
and the directional adjacency is such that it is b to a.
However, these relationships present a problem in the duplicate identification of
adjacencies. Because the code is run with an embedded loop structure, two lines are
compared at two distinct times. Therefore, the code captures a single adjacency between
lines a and b not once, but twice. This isn’t the case for the within class of relationships
because the relationship is non-reversible. That is, if an endpoint of a is within the
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polyline b, the reverse relationship does not hold true (there is no such thing as the
polyline of b being within the endpoint of a). The adjacency at endpoints is duplicated
because the relationships are reversible: an endpoint in polyline a touching an endpoint
in polyline b will be recorded a second time because it is the same as an endpoint in
polyline b touching an endpoint in polyline a.
C.5 Correcting Topologies
(1 Jul 2013) A major phase in the research concerns correcting the network
topologies within the infrastructure dataset. The particular dataset was chosen because it
seemed to have the best topological relations of all the data received. However, upon
closer inspection, topological errors still existed necessitating corrections be made before
proceeding to the analysis portion of the research. Such corrections are depicted in
Figure C5.
Figure C5 shows two examples of corrections needed throughout the data.
Correction #1 is an example of a missing connection between two different networks.
For this example, there is no connection between the TEP 46 KV distribution lines and
the second of two structures within the switching station complex. Correction #2 is an
example of a missing connection within a single electrical circuit. To correct both errors,
lines will have to be added to the data (or extended to complete the respective circuits).
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TEP 46KV

Correction #2

Duct Bank

Switching
Station

Correction #1

Figure C5. Examples of necessary topological corrections.26

C.6 Correcting Cycles in the Water Infrastructure
(13 July 2013) Much like the electrical infrastructure, topological corrections to
the dataset must be made before any analysis can take place. Figure C6 provides an
output of the cycles that exist in the existing dataset. The figure displays the code for the
simple_cycles method from the networkX module. Even after the extensive topological
cleaning, the current network has twelve cycles that prevent the matrix operations in the
IIM from being carried out.
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Figure C6. Output for cycle detection procedure.27
Each bracketed line in Figure C6 is a list of nodes that compose each of the
twelve cycles in the system. On further investigation, Figure C7 illustrates the difficulty
in detecting cycles visually. The primary difficulty in visual detection is due to the large
volume of lines that might constitute a cycle. Figure C7 displays one cycle that has been
captured at a particular “zoom” level, but other cycles exist which span larger geographic
areas and others that are “hidden” within other network lines. Additionally, because the
topology of the given network is not exact (i.e., preceding line end points do not match
up perfectly to successive line start points), the cycle depicted in C7 shows lines that may
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not appear to participate in a cycle, but enhanced zooming into a particular connection
shows that, in fact, it does.

Figure C7. An example of a “cycle” in ArcMap.28

C.7 Conclusion
This appendix provides a sample of the procedure logs that directly related to the
topological cleaning phase of the research. The time span of the work encompassed
approximately five weeks of work and focused only on the data preparation to correct the
network topologies of each of the infrastructure. Without a corrected topology, analysis
on the data is not possible and this cleaning phase implemented several methods to
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correct topologies throughout the network. These methods included manual data
preparation, script development to partially automate the workflow, and script
development to detect and correct cycles within the network. Further work beyond this
phase includes Python script development to implement the enhanced IIM model as well
as script development for plotting and display of the results.
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